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PREFACE

T

he Public Oversight Board (the "Board") was created in 1977 by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (the "AICPA") to
oversee and report on the Peer Review Program for firms that audit
publicly held entities. The program is administered by the SEC Practice
Section of the Division for CPA Firms. The SEC Practice Section is gov
erned, in turn, by an Executive Committee composed of volunteer profes
sionals. The Peer Review Program is directed by the Peer Review
Committee, also composed of volunteers. Peer reviews of members are
performed by firms or groups of auditors who are hired by the member
firms to be reviewed and who report to such member firms the results of
their reviews.
Since the peer review process is performed and administered by
auditors, the AICPA determined that public confidence would be in
creased by creation of an independent oversight board composed of
"prominent individuals of high integrity and reputation." The Board was
created to perform that oversight function and to assure that the Peer Re
view Program is carried out in a manner consistent with the public inter
est. The Board's first chairman was John J. McCloy, one of the great
Americans of this century, who epitomized the "high integrity and repu
tation" sought in Board members.

The Board's independence is evidenced by its power to select the
successors of its members, hire and compensate its staff, set the compensa
tion of its members, and choose the Board's chairman.
The Board's principal functions are: (1) to oversee the operation of
the Peer Review Program; and (2) to oversee the activities of the Quality
Control Inquiry Committee (the "QCIC"). The QCIC was established in
1979 to review the practice quality implications of lawsuits alleging de
fects in the audits of publicly held entities.
The staff of the Chief Accountant of the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") regularly reviews the Board's files to determine
whether the peer review and the QCIC programs are being properly con
ducted and properly overseen by the Board. The SEC staff's conclusions
are reflected in the Commission's annual reports which have stated that
the SEC Practice Section's programs have increased the reliability of
audits. In addition, the Board itself meets from time to time with the SEC
commissioners. The Board routinely makes recommendations for im
provement in the peer review and QCIC programs. The Board also pub
lishes an annual report "and such other reports as may be deemed
necessary with respect to its activities."

iii

Over time the Board has gone beyond the oversight of the peer re
view and QCIC programs because it felt that the public and the profession
would be ill served if these programs functioned flawlessly while other
forces eroded public confidence in the profession and the services it per
forms. Thus, the Board and its members have included commentary in
annual reports, given speeches and written articles, testified before con
gressional committees and commissioned special studies on matters bear
ing directly on the integrity of the audit process.

Robert K. Mautz, Vice Chairman

Melvin R. Laird

Robert F. Froehlke

March 5 , 1993
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REPORT OF THE PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD ON
ISSUES CONFRONTING THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION

INTRODUCTION
epresentatives of a number of accounting firms requested that the
Public Oversight Board (the ''Board") consider whether it could sup
port the accounting profession's efforts to obtain relief from what
the profession believes to be an excessive burden of litigation. The Board
agreed to consider the request and to determine whether such litigation
was adversely affecting the public interest.

R

The Board had already been concerned with the extent and impact of
litigation and the influence of publicized allegations, litigation settlements
and judgments on the public perception of the accounting profession and
its performance. Attacks on the accounting profession from a variety of
sources suggested a significant public concern with the profession's per
formance. Of particular moment is the widespread belief that auditors
have a responsibility for detecting management fraud which they are not
now meeting. The Board could not ignore these signs of failing public
confidence in public accountants and auditing. A general loss of confi
dence in the audit function would pose severe problems for our credit
economy.
The Board believes that the integrity and reliability of audited finan
cial statements are critical to the American economy. Management, inves
tors, creditors and government agencies make decisions of enormous
magnitude in reliance upon such statements. Roughly half of a trillion
dollars was invested in or loaned to corporations last year. A substantial
portion of those funds were used to finance the expansion and improve
ment of production facilities. Decisions about the ways in which funds
are committed are made on the basis of financial information available to
management. Investors and creditors provide funds on the basis of the
same information. Without the auditor's opinion, investors and creditors
would have to rely on the unverified — and possibly self-serving — state
ments of those seeking the funds. The quality and value of that opinion
are clearly debased when management fraud and illegalities go unde
tected.
Trustworthy, quality audits are essential to the efficient allocation of
resources in our capitalistic society, and the detection of management
fraud and illegal conduct is equally essential to this society. Because of
these facts and the Board' s belief that implementation of the recommenda
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tions in this Report will improve the usefulness and reliability of financial
statements and the ability of auditors to detect fraud and illegalities, the
Board urges that the recommendations in this Report receive careful con
sideration and quick implementation.

Basis fo r th e R ecom m endations in th is R eport
Board members have become familiar with the profession and its prob
lems during their aggregate of forty-five years membership on the Public
Oversight Board. During those years, the Board has met with literally
hundreds of members of the profession, including its leaders, for the ex
press purpose of discussing the effectiveness of the self-regulatory pro
gram and the quality of the profession's performance. Board members
have also met frequently with government officials who have an interest
in auditing matters and the accounting profession. This includes the
chairmen and commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the "SEC "), its chief accountants, the Comptroller General of the United
States, the chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and
ranking staff members of congressional committees. In preparing this Re
port, Board members held special meetings with some of those who had
been most helpful in the past and with others knowledgeable about the
accounting profession and its current performance.

Scope o f th is R eport
Although discussions with representatives of the profession and some of
its critics revealed a wide range of matters that warranted attention, the
examination of these matters is organized under a limited number of
broad topics. First, the Board turned its attention to what has been fre
quently referred to as the "litigation crisis." Chapter I focuses on the
Board's inquiry into the extent of the litigation crisis, its causes, its present
and potential impact on the accounting profession, and its remedies.
In Chapter II, the Board turns its attention to the accounting profes
sion's present self-regulatory program for accounting firms, its genesis,
constituent activities, and documented success. Because that program has
not been without critics, the report includes a description of some alterna
tive regulatory proposals and evaluates such proposals as possible re
placements for the existing program.
In Chapter III, the Board sets forth a number of recommendations to
make self-regulation more effective by assuring that any lessons to be
drawn from allegations of audit failure will be identified to the profession
as a whole.
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Although litigation and some of the recent settlements and judg
ments resulting therefrom have contributed significantly to the current
erosion of public confidence in accounting and auditing, the Board is con
vinced that more than alleged audit failures has influenced the public's
present perception of independent public accountants and widened the
"expectation gap." Chapter IV includes recommendations for changes in
standards to make financial statements and audit reports more under
standable and useful.
Chapter V proposes a number of recommendations for improving
and strengthening the profession's performance by enhancing its capacity
and willingness to detect fraud, strengthening professionalism and inde
pendence and improving financial reporting.

3

CHAPTER I
TH E L ITIGATION CRISIS
This chapter discusses the existing litigation crisis, together with
the Board's views on the need for litigation reform.
he last decade has seen an explosion of litigation in the United States.
Much of this litigation has involved accounting firms.

T

When a client company and its management are sued because of al
leged fraud or other misfeasance on the part of management or faulty fi
nancial statements, the auditor is commonly named, along with the client
company, the company's officers and directors, underwriters, counsel for
the client and others. Allegations that in auditing the financial statements
of a client company auditors failed in performing their common law or
statutory duties have become commonplace. Not infrequently, a number
of the other defendants are bankrupt or have modest assets, with the re
sult that the accounting firm is the only defendant to whom the plaintiffs
can look for monetary redress.
Even if these actions are dismissed before trial — as many are — the
cost of pursuing a case to dismissal is often very high. In many cases the
high cost of pursuing litigation makes a settlement, including on occa
sions, the payment of damages even when no audit failure may have oc
curred, both reasonable and economically attractive.

Need fo r a Lim iting P rinciple
The history of accountant litigation has been characterized by a constant
search for a principle that would limit the universe of circumstances in
which an auditor should be liable. In our society, the auditor's opinion
has tremendous commercial importance and is relied upon heavily in fi
nancially huge transactions. Hence, the damages traceable to an alleged
accounting or auditing error can be of great financial consequence. The
auditor's opinion is often circulated and relied upon by many more than
those to whom it was directed and for whose use it was intended. The
monetary benefit which accrues to accountants is minuscule in relation to
the liability which can be imposed if there is no reasonable limiting princi
ple.
In the landmark case, Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y.
1931), decided by the New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in
New York State), Benjamin Cardozo, the brilliant jurist then serving as
5
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chief justice of that court (and who later served as a Justice of the United
States Supreme Court), clearly recognized the consequences of extending
the liability of auditors too far:
A different question develops when we ask whether [the auditors]
owed a duty to [creditors and investors of the auditor's client] to
make [the audit] without negligence. If liability for negligence ex
ists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or
forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose ac
countants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeter
minate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt
whether a flaw may not exist in the implications of a duty that ex
poses to these consequences (emphasis added).
For many years, "privity" was the limiting principle which protected
the auditor from ruinous liability. That principle, which generally re
quires that the auditor have had a contractual relationship with the plain
tiff or that the plaintiff have been the specifically intended user of the
financial statements, has been eroded by many courts. It is noteworthy,
however, that recently the Supreme Court in California, where lower
courts had perhaps done the most to undercut the force of privity, af
firmed its commitment to this principle in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834
P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).

The Fed eral Securities Acts
The advent of the federal securities laws in 1933 and 1934 created dra
matic new liability risks to auditors. The Securities Act of 1933 provided
that auditors whose opinions on financial statements were filed as parts of
registration statements in connection with public offerings were liable for
the damage suffered by investors attributable to misstatements or omis
sions in the financial statements on which they opined unless they had, af
ter reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe, and did
believe, that the financial statements did not contain a material misstate
ment or omit any statement necessary to make the financial statements not
misleading.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 exposed auditors to additional
liability, though the threshold of liability is somewhat higher than under
the 1933 Act. While other sections of that Act create some liability expo
sure for auditors, the principal basis for asserting auditor liability has been
section 10(b). Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 under it make it unlawful,
among other things, for any person to buy or sell a security through
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fraudulent or deceptive means or by making an untrue statement of mate
rial fact or omitting to state a material fact." Aiding and abetting" a viola
tion of rule 10b-5 is also actionable.1
The United States Supreme Court, in a landmark case involving a
major accounting firm, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976),
decided that for a person to be liable under rule 10b-5, it had to be shown
that the person had knowingly violated the rule. Subsequent courts of ap
peal cases extended liability to situations in which the defendant acted
with recklessness tantamount to a knowing wrongdoing.
Typically, an auditor's liability under rule 10b-5 is based upon the al
legation that in stating its opinion that the financial statements fairly pre
sent the financial position and the results of operations of an entity in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") and
in stating that its audit was conducted in accordance with generally ac
cepted auditing standards, the auditor either knowingly or recklessly
made a material misstatement.

R easons fo r C oncern in th e A ccounting Profession
There are several reasons for the accounting profession's extremely high
level of concern with auditors' exposure to liability. First, there has been a
significant increase in the number of cases charging misstatements of finan
cial information by corporations and in the amount of damages sought.
When a corporation announces a substantial write-off or other material ad
verse event, when its stock price drops dramatically or when its earnings
drop sharply, it is commonplace for multiple suits to be filed, often within
hours or days of the event, well before any sort of searching inquiry could be
conducted. These suits, which routinely name the auditors as defendants,
generally charge that the audited financial statements should have reflected
the event or information that allegedly caused investor losses.
Second, a number of multi-million dollar judgments have been ren
dered in recent years against accounting firms, and a number of very sub
stantial settlements have been made, sometimes out of fear of
unreasonable verdicts. Notable among these judgments are last year's
$338 million dollar jury verdict in Arizona against a major accounting firm
(the case has been ordered to be retried) and a verdict in the amount of
$204 million against a major accounting firm awarded by a jury in
1

Aiding and abetting liability under rule 10b-5 generally requires (1) a primary
violation by another, (2) knowledge of the primary violation by the aider and
abettor, and (3) substantial assistance by the aider and abettor.
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Galveston, Texas (settled for an estimated $45 million). A summary of the
latter case illustrates the excesses of this kind of litigation.
The plaintiffs in the action, investors who had bought about $18
million in Miniscribe bonds sold in 1987, were awarded $20 mil
lion in actual damages and $530 million in punitive damages. Of
these amounts, $4 million in compensatory and $200 million in
punitive damages were levied against Coopers & Lybrand . . . . 2
Third, at least one important, second-tier accounting firm has been
bankrupted by, among other things, the extensive liabilities which
stemmed from litigation. The partnership's assets and insurance were in
sufficient to satisfy all claims allowed in its bankruptcy, with the result
that some individual partners were reported to have been required to con
tribute over $500,000 each toward the settlement of claims.3
Fourth, leaders of the accounting profession have expressed concern
that, as a consequence of litigation liabilities, one or more of the major
firms may be rendered insolvent with devastating consequences, not only
for the partners and employees of the failed firm, but also for the profes
sion as a whole and indeed for the public interest as well. These leaders of
the profession point to the impact such an event would have on the will
ingness of partners in other firms to continue to pursue their careers ex
posed to such liability dangers, the difficulties of recruiting outstanding
persons into a profession so imperilled, the complications which would be
posed for clients of the failed firm in satisfying the SEC requirements that
financial statements filed annually be audited by independent account
ants, and a host of other extremely damaging consequences which would
flow from such an event.4
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2

Paul Geoghan, Punitive Damages: A Storm Over the Accounting Profession, J.
Acct., July 1992, at 47 (emphasis added).

3

L&H: The Grim Realty, Pub. Acct. Rep., May 31, 1992, at 4. Laventhol and
Horwath, then the seventh largest accounting firm in the United States, was forced
into bankruptcy in large measure because of a staggering $2 billion in liability
claims and the resulting cost of defending against the lawsuits. The former
partners agreed to pay $48 million as part of the liquidation of the firm in order to
avoid personal bankruptcy.

4

Arthur Andersen & Co., Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG Peat
Marwick & Price Waterhouse, The Liability Crisis in the United States: Impact on
the Accounting Profession, A Statement of Position 3-5 (Aug. 6, 1992), in J. Acct.,
Nov. 1992, at 21-24.

TH E LITIGATION CRISIS

The B oard’s View o f th e Need fo r Litigation Reform
The Board has examined the evidence available on the liability exposure
of the accounting profession. It has examined that exposure from the
standpoints of fundamental fairness, the future development of the pro
fession and the preservation of a sound accounting profession. From all
these perspectives, it has concluded that the public interest requires reme
dial legislation.
The Board believes that, apart from the danger of the collapse of one
or more major firms — which it does not take lightly — the litigation risks
confronting the profession pose serious dangers to its ability to perform
its assigned role in society. While no systematic study appears to have
been made, there is ample anecdotal evidence that the liability threat is a
factor students are now taking into account in determining whether to
pursue a career in public accounting. There have been instances of prom
ising young managers refusing partnership in accounting firms because of
concerns with exposing their personal assets to litigation risks. There
have also been instances in which these concerns were important factors
in the decision of partners to leave public accounting for corporate posi
tions. These are reasonable and expectable responses to the highly publi
cized risks of becoming a partner in an accounting firm.
The litigation liability danger directly affects the public, as well as
the profession, in other ways; for example, the profession is increasingly
reluctant to provide assurances on forward-looking financial data or other
"soft information" that would be of benefit to the capital markets.5 There
is a flood of other types of financial information which is becoming in
creasingly available to users of financial information. The accounting pro
fession has the expertise and the objectivity to provide assurances to the
public regarding many of the new types of information. The profession
would be more inclined to provide these assurances if the "Damocles
Sword" of excessive liability claims did not hang over it.
Moreover, since many of the suits result from the failure of small
companies, firms are reportedly refusing to undertake the audits of such
companies because of the higher risks associated with such audits. This
poses a grave problem because it severely hampers the access of such
companies to the credit and equity markets. This could significantly ham
per the ability of small companies to grow, create jobs and develop imagi-

5

The management's discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of
operations as required by Item 303 of Regulation S-K, financial forecasts and
information about compliance with laws are examples of such information.
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native products and services, all of which would be a severe national det
riment, since small companies created more than half of all new jobs in the
last decade.
Apart from these considerations, and transcending them, there is the
question of fairness. In many instances, the role of the auditor in relation
to a fraud is peripheral. It is noteworthy how very few are the instances in
which a certified public accountant has knowingly and deliberately given
a false opinion or participated in a client's misdeeds. A typical pattern is
for an executive and one or more conspirators within a company to perpe
trate a cunning fraud carefully designed to be concealed, not only from
colleagues within the company, but also from its auditor.6
In another typical scenario, the financial statements are prepared by
management using liberal interpretations of permissible accounting prac
tices. The auditor, unable to point convincingly to prohibitions against
the use of the alternative interpretation chosen by management, gives its
honest opinion that the statements fairly present the financial position and
the results of operations of the entity in conformity with GAAP. Then,
when the company fails or suffers a setback, these honest judgments are
transmuted into grossly overdrawn charges.
In these situations, and in innumerable others, it is unfair to put the
entire onus upon the auditor. Auditors should be accountable for their
conduct and they should bear responsibility for the consequences of their
legal failings and shortcomings; however, they should not be responsible
or accountable for the shortcomings of others. A system that would allo
cate financial responsibility among those involved in a financial failure or
in financial misdeeds in proportion to the responsibility of each for losses
suffered by investors and creditors would, in the estimation of the Board,
be fairer and more compatible with the American sense of justice than is

6
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AU Section 316.07 states; "Because of the characteristics of irregularities,
p a rtic u la rly those involving forgery and collusion, a properly designed and
executed audit may not detect a material irregularity. For example, generally
accepted auditing standards do not require that an auditor authenticate documents,
nor is the auditor trained to do so. Also, audit procedures that are effective for
detecting a misstatement that is unintentional may be ineffective for a misstatement
that is intentional and is concealed through collusion between client personnel and
third parties or among management or employees of the client." 1 Codification of
Professional Standards, U.S. Auditing Standards (AICPA) § 316.07, at 245-2 (Jan.
1992).
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the present system, which can result in the full monetary loss being borne
by a relatively minor participant.

Prop osed Legislative Reform s
Much of the risk to the accounting profession derives from the fact that its
responsibility is "joint and several" with other named defendants. An al
ternative to the familiar "joint and several" liability is "separate and pro
portionate" liability as a basis for allocating damages. This is the standard
urged by the profession and others. Under "joint and several," each de
fendant can be held liable for the full loss suffered by the plaintiffs. Thus,
if the only defendant with insurance protection or substantial assets is the
accounting firm, it may be held liable for the damages caused by each of
the parties even though the losses suffered may be mainly the result of
economic events or the wrongdoing of others. Under a "separate and pro
portionate" formulation, the trier of fact determines the proportion of the
loss caused by each defendant and allocates the damages among the de
fendants based on that determination. Thus, for instance, if the trier of
fact determined that only 20% of a loss was caused by the failure of the
auditor to perform a proper audit, then th e damages payable by the audi
tor would be only 20% of the aggregate damages.
The main thrust of the profession's efforts for legislative refor m is di
rected toward Congress even though most claims are made under state
laws. A few states have adopted the "separate and proportionate" assess
ment of damages, but most have not. Because the practices of many ac
counting firms cross state lines, the "separate and proportionate"
formulation must apply to state as well as federal claims to be effective.
Since securing relief in a sufficient number of states would probably prove
to be excessively difficult, federal preemptive legislation should be
sought.
The legislation proposed by the profession, which was introduced in
the 102nd Congress and has been reintroduced in the present Congress,
contains, in addition to the "separate and proportionate" reform, other
provisions that shift the prevailing party's attorneys' fees to the losing
party (as is generally done in the United Kingdom) and that eliminate sev
eral litigation practices seen as abusive. The Board observes that there are
a number of complex public policy implications in these other proposals
which need to be evaluated in the broader context of tort reform and
hence expresses no opinion on them.
In addition, the profession should continue to press for reform of the
civil liability provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi
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zations Act ("RICO") of the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act. These
provisions, which create the danger of treble damages in virtually all cases
charging auditors with violations of the federal securities laws, create un
warranted pressures on defendants to settle claims which might otherwise
be litigated to a successful conclusion for the defendants. The RICO pro
visions have created a powerful tool which plaintiffs' attorneys use suc
cessfully to secure settlements in excess of what would otherwise be
justified.
The RICO civil liability provisions have been extended by courts well
beyond the very real problem of organized criminal activity that led to
their enactment. Congress should amend the RICO civil liability provi
sions to eliminate their application to actions under the federal securities
laws.
Let there be no misunderstanding: The Board's advocacy of the re
forms discussed above should not be construed to mean the Board does
not believe accountants and their firms should be responsible civilly and,
in those rare cases where the circumstances indicate criminal conduct,
criminally, for their conduct. The Board believes that the existence of civil
remedies for misconduct in connection with professional activity is both
fair and appropriate as a powerful inducement to professionals to adhere
to proper standards of conduct.

RECOMMENDATION I-1:
Financial responsibility among those involved in a financial failure
or in fraudulent financial reporting should be allocated in propor
tion to responsibility for losses suffered. Accordingly, "separate
and proportionate" liability legislation applicable to both federal
and state claims should be enacted by Congress. The civil liability
provisions of RICO should be amended to eliminate treble dam
ages in cases that arise under the federal securities laws.

In co rp o ratio n o f A ccounting Firm s
The partnership mode of accounting practice became common at about
the turn of the century. It was chosen to assure clients and others that the
partners in accounting firms were financially committed to the integrity of
their work. This kind of commitment was commendable and reasonable
in a time when partners in even the largest firms knew each other. The

12
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time is long past when this sort of knowledge is possible. This form of or
ganization for the profession is obsolete and should be discarded.
The membership of the American Institute of Certified Public Ac
countants (the "AICPA") has modified its Code of Professional Conduct
to permit firms to practice in corporate or quasi-corporate form, which
would limit the liability of partners not at fault in a deficient audit to the
amount of their investment in the firm. The Board believes it is important
for firms in the profession to be permitted to practice accountancy in a
corporate or quasi-corporate form that preserves the liability of an indi
vidual partner for his or her derelictions, but does not visit the conse
quences upon other partners. The financial security and well-being of the
officers of, say, General Electric are not imperilled by the misdeed of one
of their number. There is no more reason why all partners in modem
multi-national accounting firms, which often count their partners in the
thousands, should be in peril because of the laxity or incompetence of one
of their number.
As matters now stand, the AICPA's amendment to its Code of Pro
fessional Conduct, to be effective, must be implemented by state action
permitting the corporate or quasi-corporate form of organization. Secur
ing approval in fifty states for firms to practice in a corporate or quasi-cor
porate form will be time consuming and difficult. Therefore, the Board
believes this is a situation where Congress should adopt preemptive legis
lation that authorizes accounting firms to incorporate or to become lim
ited liability companies under federal law. The legislation should provide
that accountants organized under the federal statute could not be barred
from practicing in states that do not allow a structure which limits recov
ery to the assets of the firm, the available liability insurance and the assets
of the errant professionals involved. The objective is to get innocent part
ners' personal assets out of harm's way.

RECOMMENDATION I-2:
Congress should adopt preemptive legislation to perm it the prac
tice of accountancy in a form that appropriately lim its the liability
of individual members of the firm .
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CHAPTER I
ASSESSMENT OF THE S E C PRACTICE SECTION’S
SELF-REGULATORY PROGRAMS
This chapter provides background material about the SEC Practice
Section's programs, an assessment o f their effectiveness and a
recommendation to assure that auditors o f all SEC
registrants are subject to peer review.

C

ritics of the accounting profession have not spared the self-regula
tory program for accounting firms overseen by the Board. Some ar
gue that the major fault of the present program is that it does not
identify failed audits, establish fault in such failures and impose appropri
ate sanctions.
Some of these criticisms suggest that the profession's present selfregulatory program for accounting firms is so unsatisfactory that some
other form of regulation should be adopted. The National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. (the "NASD") and the National Transportation
Safety Board (the "NTSB") have been suggested as models to be emulated
by the accounting profession.
Because of such criticism, the Board undertook a thorough review of
the present self-regulatory program and its history and an examination of
the suggested alternatives to that program. This and the following chap
ter of this special Report present some of the Board's findings and its rec
ommendations growing out of that review.

The P rofession ’s Self-Regulatory Program s
In 1977, the AICPA started an ambitious new program of self-regulation
for accounting firms. This was partially in response to the hearings con
ducted by the late Senator Lee Metcalf, partially in response to the SEC's
endorsement of peer reviews, and partially in response to years of discus
sions within the accounting profession about the need for, and benefits of,
expanded self-regulation.
The AICPA organized the Division for CPA Firms, which was di
vided into two sections: one, the Private Companies Practice Section de
signed for firms that do not audit clients which file reports with the SEC;
and two, the SEC Practice Section, intended for firms that do audit clients
which file with the SEC. Membership in either section was voluntary.
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Many firms joined both sections. The firms that audited the overwhelming
majority of entities that filed with the SEC joined the SEC Practice Section, as
did many firms with no SEC clients. In January 1990, the AICPA amended
its bylaws to provide that no AICPA member could be associated with a firm
which audited one or more ''SEC clients" unless the firm was a member of
the SEC Practice Section. The AICPA has implemented this bylaw change by
defining "SEC client" as an "issuer making an initial filing . . . under the Se
curities Act of 1933" and a "registrant that files periodic reports . . . with the
SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (except brokers or dealers
registered only because of Section 15(a) of the Act) or the Investment Com
pany Act of 1940."
The Peer Review Committee (the "PRC") and the Quality Control In
quiry Committee (the "QCIC") are the working arms of the SEC Practice
Section. (These self-regulatory programs are explained further in Appen
dix B.) The PRC administers the Peer Review Program of the SEC Practice
Section, which requires each member firm to have its quality controls and
its compliance with them reviewed by other auditors every three years.
The QCIC administers a program which examines the quality controls of
firms against whom allegations of failure in connection with the audit of
an SEC client, as well as certain other entities, have been made to find out
whether the allegations indicate that there is a quality control deficiency.

The P eer Review P rogram
The triennial peer reviews required of members of the SEC Practice Section
are conducted by teams of experienced auditors from other SEC Practice Sec
tion member firms. Team leaders are required to attend special courses to
qualify for peer review work. The peer review includes reviewing relevant
materials setting forth the firm's quality control standards and practices; de
termining whether the SEC Practice Section's membership requirements, in
cluding such matters as continuing professional education requirements,
have been satisfied; and examining selected audits to determine whether
they were conducted properly and in accordance with the firm's and the pro
fession's quality control standards. The work of the peer review teams is
carefully reviewed by the PRC under the oversight of the Board's staff.
These reviews occasionally identify an audit that was not done in ac
cordance with generally accepted auditing standards or financial state
ments that were not prepared in accordance with GAAP. When such a
problem is encountered, the firm is required to take appropriate action,
e.g., undertake additional audit procedures or withdraw its opinion and
advise its client to amend the financial statements to bring them into com
pliance with GAAP.
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If quality deficiencies are found and the firm fails to take corrective
action, the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section has the
authority to impose sanctions. These have included: (1) corrective meas
ures by the firm, including measures involving personnel; (2) additional
continuing professional education; (3) accelerated or special peer reviews;
(4) admonishments, censures, or reprimands; (5) suspension from mem
bership in the SEC Practice Section; and (6) expulsion from membership.

Effectiveness of the Peer Review Program
The Board's assessment of the Peer Review Program provides abundant
evidence that it is a success.
■

Since 1983, the SEC's Annual Reports have stated that the SEC
Practice Section's Peer Review Program has enhanced the quality
and consistency of practice before the Commission.

■

Federal and state regulators and legislators are increasingly man
dating peer reviews of auditors who undertake audit and attest en
gagements of entities or programs that use governmental funds.

■

The Board's 1991-92 Annual Report noted that 25% of the ap
proximately 300 firms subject to initial peer reviews in 1991 (most
of whom joined the SEC Practice Section because of the AICPA
bylaw change) received opinions in publicly available reports
that the firms' quality control systems were significantly flawed.
By contrast, 93% of the firms that had repeat reviews were re
ported to have satisfactory quality control systems. This is strong
evidence that the peer review process has a significant effect on
the quality of auditing.

Avoidance of Peer Review
As noted, in 1990 the AICPA amended its bylaws to provide that no mem
ber of the AICPA could be associated with a firm which audited one or
more SEC clients unless the firm was a member of the SEC Practice Sec
tion. At the present time, an overwhelming number of SEC clients are
audited by members of the SEC Practice Section. However, there are
some sole practitioners and small firms that continue to audit SEC clients
without ever having had a peer review.7 Several years ago the SEC con-

7

See, e.g., Daniel Pearl, How 2 Florida Firms Fooled Stockholders, Auditors and the
SEC, Wall St. J., July 8,1992, at A1 (discussing the audits of Cascade International
Inc. and College Bound Inc.)
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sidered a proposal that would have required that all auditors of SEC reg
istrants — which include the same entities referred to by the AICPA as
SEC clients — except certain foreign and predecessor auditors and audi
tors involved in an initial public offering, be included in a peer review
program having certain minimal characteristics. The Commission's reluc
tance to adopt this rule was based on concern that it lacked the power to
do so.
The Board believes the Commission has the power to require SEC
registrants to disclose appropriate information about the peer review of
the registrant's auditor. The Board recommends that the Commission
amend its rules to require such disclosure because it will assist in prevent
ing situations in which the auditors of SEC registrants manage to avoid
the peer review process.

Recommendation II-1:
The SEC should amend its rules to require SEC registrants to dis
close whether their auditors have had a peer review, the date of the
most recent peer review and its results.

The Q uality C ontrol Inquiry Com m ittee P rogram
The Mission of the QCIC
The QCIC performs one of the two principal functions of the SEC Practice
Section's self-regulatory effort. Accounting firms that are members of the
SEC Practice Section must report to the QCIC allegations of deficiencies in
the conduct of an audit of present or former SEC clients made in civil suits
or criminal indictments against the member firm or its personnel or in any
public proceeding or investigation by a regulatory agency. In addition,
members must report allegations relating to the conduct of an audit of a
financial institution that files periodic reports under the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934, and of an audit of a subsidiary or investee of an SEC
client if the financial statements of such an entity are presented separately
in the parent or investor company's filing.
Further, the QCIC may request member firms to report allegations of
deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of a non-SEC client not otherwise
covered by the requirement if the Executive Committee of the SEC Prac
tice Section feels there is "a significant public interest in [such alleged]
audit failure." The QCIC may also request member firms to report allega
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tions of deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of financial statements of a
regulated financial institution even if it is not an SEC client or is not pub
licly held.
Reports of allegations of audit deficiencies must be filed with the
QCIC within 30 days of the service of the first pleading on the firm. The
QCIC's mission is to review the allegations of audit failure against the
member firm to determine:
(a) Whether the allegations indicate a need for corrective measures
by the member firm with respect to the firm's quality control
system; and
(b) Whether the facts related to the specific alleged audit failure
indicate that changes in generally accepted auditing standards
or quality control standards need to be considered. If the QCIC
finds guidance on the application of GAAP inadequate, the
QCIC reports the situation to the AICPA's Accounting
Standards Executive Committee.
If a member firm refuses to cooperate with the QCIC or fails to take
the corrective actions deemed reasonable and necessary by the QCIC, the
Committee may ask the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice Section
to impose sanctions.

Effectiveness of the QCIC
Since its inception, the QCIC has made numerous recommendations for
actions to be taken by firms or the profession as a result of the QCIC re
view of reported cases. In addition to corrective measures addressing spe
cific quality control deficiencies, the QCIC has required special reviews,
reviews of other relevant work, and expanded peer reviews. In addition,
the QCIC has made referrals to appropriate AICPA technical bodies urg
ing them to consider the need for changes in, or guidance on, professional
standards and to the AICPA Professional Ethics Division, with a recom
mendation for investigation of the work of specific individuals.
The accounting profession and the SEC have both said that the QCIC
plays an important role in the self-regulatory process. The 1987 report of
the SEC Practice Section Task Force on SIC Methodology said that the
QCIC (previously known as the Special Investigations Committee (SIC)),
"[performs] a very important role in enhancing the future quality of prac
tice of member firms . . . a role not necessarily performed by the SEC or
the courts." The SEC's 1991 Annual Report states:
The Commission believes that the [QCIC] process provides added as
surances, as a supplement to the SEC Practice Section peer review
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program, that major quality control deficiencies, if any, are identi
fied and addressed in a more timely fashion. Therefore, the Com
mission believes th at the QCIC process benefits the public interest.
The Board believes that the QCIC performs an essential function.
The Board's goal in re-examining the QCIC process and considering alter
native models has been to recommend measures to make it even more re
sponsive to the public interest and the public's expectations.

Scope of the QCIC's Role
The QCIC process was never intended to determine whether an audit fail
ure had occurred as alleged or the reasons for the failure if one did occur;
the QCIC was not given the power to punish anyone for misconduct in
performing an audit. When it established the QCIC, the Executive Com
mittee of the SEC Practice Section believed that giving the QCIC such a
mandate would duplicate existing means of determining the existence of,
and reasons for, an audit failure, which include civil litigation brought by
persons allegedly harmed, injunctive and disciplinary proceedings by the
SEC, proceedings by state licensing boards and AICPA proceedings for
ethical violations. A determination in a QCIC proceeding that there had
been an audit failure or that specific individuals were responsible for an
audit failure would not preclude a re-examination of those questions in
civil litigation, an SEC proceeding or an action by state authorities or the
AICPA.
The courts, the SEC and other regulatory and governmental bodies
can secure evidence through subpoenaed documents and sworn testi
mony to determine whether allegations of audit failure are valid and, if so,
can impose appropriate sanctions on firms and individuals while protect
ing the rights of all parties. Without such power, a self-regulatory body
would rarely be able to make a fair and just judgment as to whether an
audit was deficient or someone was guilty of a misdeed. Audit documen
tary evidence alone rarely is sufficient to indicate whether an audit has
been substandard. Working papers cannot reflect what the auditor does
not know — whether documents were falsified, agreements were con
cealed or fictitious transactions were engaged in — or whether the audi
tor's ignorance stemmed from neglect or artful deceit by management. To
determine what the auditor should have known — which is necessary to
determine culpability — almost always requires access to client docu
ments and records and the testimony of client personnel who are unlikely
to testify voluntarily or to produce documents establishing their own mis
conduct. (It is noteworthy that even a statutorily authorized self-regulator
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like the NASD [see p. 23 and Appendix C] does not have the power to
subpoena documents or witnesses.)
The Board believes these considerations are as valid now as they
were when the QCIC was established in 1979 and that the mandate of the
QCIC should not be expanded to include determining whether audit fail
ures have occurred or who may have been responsible for the failure.

C onsideration o f A lternative R egulatory Structures
In re-evaluating the SEC Practice Section's self-regulatory program, and par
ticularly the QCIC portion of that program, the Board considered other
mechanisms that might serve the public interest better than the present pro
gram. These included the accounting regulatory structures in the United
Kingdom and Canada and the NASD and the NTSB in the U.S. The NASD
was chosen for study since it has been mentioned frequently as a possible
model for a new self-regulatory structure for the accounting profession.8 The
NTSB was chosen because its remedial objective is the same as the QCIC's
and its means for achieving that objective most closely resembles what the
Board believes should be an additional activity of the QCIC, namely, using
information about past mishaps to avoid future ones.
The Board concluded that the regulatory programs that address the
quality of audits performed in the United Kingdom and Canada have
some of the characteristics of the SEC Practice Section's self-regulatory
programs, but are not as comprehensive and provide no features not pre
sent in the SEC Practice Section's programs. The Board also concluded
that neither the NASD nor the NTSB is an appropriate model for a new ac
counting profession self-regulatory organization or system.

The National Association of Securities Dealers
Many, including some present leaders of the profession and governmental
observers, have suggested that a self-regulatory structure modelled on
that of the NASD is appropriate for the accounting profession. In 1985, a
major firm suggested such a structure and, in 1977, then-Representative John

8

See A.A. Sommer, Jr., Is There Hope For Self-Regulation?, Address at the Abraham
J. Briloff Lecture on Accounting and Society (Sept. 23, 1986), in Abraham J. Briloff
Lecture Series on Acct. & Soc'y 1985, 1986, at 20 (discussing sources for the idea of
an NASD-type self-regulatory organization for the accounting profession); Donald
H. Chapin, The Changing Image For the CPA, Remarks Before The President's
Plenary Session of the 59th Annual Conference of the New York State Society of
CPAs (June 8 , 1992), in CPA J., Dec. 1992, at 23 [hereinafter Chapin].
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Moss even incorporated such a structure in legislation that did not reach
the floor of the House. More recently, Donald H. Chapin, Assistant
Comptroller General of th e General Accounting Office, resurfaced the
idea.9
The Board believes that the NASD is a totally inappropriate model
for the accounting profession.
As indicated in Appendix C, which contains a comprehensive de
scription of the NASD, the NASD was organized pursuant to an amend
ment to the Securities Act of 1934 at a time when the securities industry
had no comprehensive self-regulatory organization.
The NASD performs various functions on behalf of the securities in
dustry that are performed quite adequately on behalf of the accounting
profession by existing entities. The NASD administers competency ex
aminations for persons in the securities industry similar to those to which
accountants are subject, and the NASD's registration procedures closely
resemble the accounting profession's licensing procedures. The NASD
has adopted and enforces "Rules of Fair Practice" which roughly corre
spond to the Code of Professional Conduct adopted by the AICPA and
enforced by it and the state boards.
Many who believe that an NASD-type self-regulatory organization
would be desirable for the accounting profession seem to believe that the
profession would benefit by a replication of the NASD's mechanisms and
procedures for enforcing its rules, and on occasion, the federal securities
laws. These NASD procedures provide for the investigation by NASD
member-constituted committees of alleged misconduct by members (or
persons associated with members) and the determination by the commit
tees of whether there has been an infraction.10
The Board believes it would be impractical for the accounting profes
sion to adopt this model to determine whether charges of audit failure are
meritorious.
The typical NASD proceeding takes a few hours and rarely do the
proceedings last longer than a day.11 Generally, the issues are fairly sim-

9

See Chapin, supra, at 23.

10

See generally Lee A. Pickard and Anthony W. Djinis, NASD Disciplinary
Proceedings: Practice and Procedure, 37 Bus. Law. 1213, 1223-37 (1982) (discussing
the NASD investigation and disciplinary process) Thereinafter Pickard & Djinis].

11

Telephone Interview with Norman Sue, Associate General Counsel, NASD (June
2 6 , 1992) [hereinafter Sue].
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ple:12 did the registered representative make false representations to cus
tomers or misappropriate funds; did the representative sell a customer a
security which was unsuitable or in conflict with customer instructions;
did the firm fail to properly supervise the activities of its employees or ac
curately maintain books and records? Usually the only evidence neces
sary for such determinations is selective records of the NASD member, the
testimony of the registered representative or of other employees of the
member (or a combination of them depending on the type of case) and, in
some cases, the records and testimony of the customer. 13 There is rarely,
if ever, a need to secure records in the possession of third parties or the
testimony of others.14 The NASD does not have subpoena powers; hence,
when it does confront a situation where such additional information
might be useful, it can only rely on the voluntary cooperation of those
having such information.15
An adequate inquiry into an alleged audit failure, on the other hand,
entails the examination of masses of papers, many of which are in the hands
of the charged firm's client who might, for reasons of self protection, refuse
to produce them. The testimony of many witnesses is usually necessary.
Such testimony would likely include employees of the client who might, for
a number of reasons — not all of them honorable — refuse to testify. The
trial of a recent case against a major accounting firm in Arizona took eleven
months. While this is not a typical case, episodic evidence indicates that
most trials take several weeks, often months. There is no reason to believe
that because a "trial" would be conducted by a self-regulatory organization,
it would be significantly simpler or more brief than a civil trial. Even if all
the information were available to reach a conclusion about the adequacy of
an audit, the availability of professionals willing to participate in such pro
longed proceedings would pose a considerable problem.
If an NASD proceeding finds that the member or an associated per
son committed a wrong, it can order reimbursement by the respondents
for losses and impose a penalty on the firm or associate, consisting of a

12

Telephone Interview with P. William Hotchkiss, Surveillance Director, NASD, and
Norman Sue, Associate General Counsel, NASD (Sept. 29, 1992) [hereinafter
Hotchkiss & Sue]; See generally, Ann C. Flannery, SRO Disciplinary Sanctions, 1991
A.B.A. Litig. Sec. Subcommittee on SRO Matters at Tab A (Summarizing Types of
NASD Disciplinary Actions for 1991).

13

Hotchkiss & Sue, supra.

14

Id.

15

See Pickard & Djinis, supra, at 1223; Sue, supra.
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monetary fine, a suspension or a bar from engaging in the securities business.16 Determination of the amount of loss suffered is usually easy and
simple and does not entail the complexities of determining, for instance,
the losses of a class of plaintiffs. The availability of an NASD proceeding
does not, however, preclude the member firm or the customer from seek
ing relief in another forum if it is dissatisfied with the outcome of the
NASD proceeding.17 If the auditor's client sought relief initially in the
courts, the NASD-type self-regulatory organization would still have an in
terest in enforcing its rules and would undoubtedly commence a separate
proceeding for the purpose of imposing a fine, a suspension or a bar
against a member or the associate of a member charged with wrongdoing.
Consequently, the NASD's model does nothing to mitigate the litigation
problem, and may in fact exacerbate it.
In short, it is difficult to see what benefit would accrue to the profes
sion, or the public, if an additional adjudicative mechanism were added to
those which already exist: the SEC which can seek either injunctive or admin
istrative relief and fines; the civil courts which can determine whether any
one with proper standing to bring suit has been harmed; and the state
disciplinary boards which have the power to bar individuals from practice
and impose penalties on firms (as several have recently done). Redundant
proceedings would be expensive, which would ultimately increase the cost
of accounting services without any demonstrable benefit to the public.

The National Transportation Safety Board
The NTSB model is described in Appendix D. The Board concluded that
the efforts of the NTSB to draw lessons from past mishaps to avoid future
mishaps is relevant to the QCIC process and that similar procedures
would be in the interest of both the profession and the public. Moreover,
the NTSB's focus is remedial rather than punitive, which is consistent with
the SEC Practice Section's objective in reviewing litigation.
The Board concluded, however, that the structure of the NTSB model
would not be appropriate for the accounting profession. NTSB investiga
tions are directed at events that require immediate on-site investigations
to establish the facts.18 The accident scene is sealed so that the integrity
and availability of relevant facts can be protected; relevant facts are then
16

See Pickard & Djinis, supra, at 1238-39; Hotchkiss & Sue, supra.

17

Hotchkiss & Sue, supra.

18

See generally 1990 NTSB Ann. Rep. to Congress 11 (discussing the function of the
NTSB).
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gathered and validated.19 Because factual information produced from
such investigations could not be reconstructed at a later date, immediacy
is essential to establishing the facts.
The gathering of factual information surrounding an alleged audit
failure does not require immediacy. The relevant audit personnel, work
papers and client records are all accessible at a later date and the passage
of time does not impede the inquiry.
Most important, while the NTSB investigates events whose occur
rence is indisputable, the existence of an audit failure is almost never in
disputable. Thus, any investigation to determine whether an audit failure
actually occurred, which would be required before "probable cause"
could be pursued, would duplicate the process of adjudicating civil claims
for monetary damages and the SEC's disciplinary and injunctive proceed
ings without additional benefit to the public.
Moreover, the NTSB's conclusions with respect to "probable cause,"
which are at the heart of the NTSB's work and which form the basis for
the remedial measures taken as a result of its investigations, generally
may not under the federal law be introduced in evidence in an y proceed
ing arising from the accident.20 This provision is intended to avoid preju
dicing the defense of those determined to have had responsibility for an
accident against charges in other proceedings. There is at present no law
which would prevent the conclusions with respect to the "probable cause"
of an alleged audit failure reached by a self-regulatory body patterned on
the NTSB from being introduced in evidence in any SEC, administrative,
civil or criminal proceeding. Obviously, the introduction of such conclu
sions in a proceeding could seriously damage the ability of an audit firm
to defend itself against charges brought against it.
The Board does not believe that the NTSB structure is appropriate
for the accounting profession even if that structure included subpoena
power and statutory protection of evidence because it would be duplica
tive of other proceedings. Nevertheless, the Board believes that the objec
tive of the QCIC's procedures can be modified so that, as the
transportation industry learns from NTSB investigations, the accounting
profession can use information gained from past allegations of audit fail
ures to improve the quality of future audits.

19

Telephone Interview with Brent N. Bahler, Director of the Office of Public Affairs,
NTSB (Sept. 2 9 , 1992) [hereinafter Bahler].

20

See 49 C.F.R. §§ 835.2-.3 (1991); Bahler, supra.
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Conclusion
The accounting profession should not pursue legislation to create an ac
counting self-regulatory organization patterned after the NASD or a body
modeled on the NTSB. Rather, as discussed in the following chapter of
this Report, the Board recommends modifications to the SEC Practice Sec
tion's membership requirements, the peer review performance standards
and the QCIC process.
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CHAPTER III
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE
SELF-REGULATORY PROCESS
FO R ACCOUNTING FIRM S
This chapter recommends modifications to the SEC Practice Section's
membership requirements, the peer review performance standards,
and the QCIC process.
M odifications o f th e Self-Regulatory P rocess to B etter
Assure A gainst Future Audit Failures
aving considered and rejected new mechanisms to regulate the ac
counting profession, the Board turned its attention to ways of im
proving the current structure to reduce the incidence of audit
failures.

H

It must be recognized that no self-regulatory process (or, for that
matter, any governmental regulatory scheme) can ever protect the public
completely from audit failures. Deficiencies in the conduct of an audit
will continue to occur irrespective of how good a firm's quality control
system is. There will always be human failures, misunderstanding of in
structions or facts, mistakes of judgment, carelessness, failures to react to
"red flags" and other personal failings. Managements will occasionally
continue to deceive auditors.
Nevertheless, the Board believes that the self-regulatory process for ac
counting firms can and must do more than it does now. The present mecha
nisms of self-regulation do not provide the opportunity for the profession to
learn from its mistakes or to improve its performance in one area that is in
creasingly troublesome — the detection of management fraud. When frauds
are perpetrated, the entire profession must learn how the financial data were
manipulated, how detection was initially avoided, what audit procedures
might have discovered the irregularity and what should be done to make
sure the same sort of mishap does not occur again.
The Board believes that the SEC Practice Section should expand its
membership requirements and its activities in a manner that will assure
that any lessons to be drawn from allegations of audit failure will be iden
tified and become available to all SEC Practice Section members and to the
profession as a whole. This can be done by having the QCIC include this
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mission in its charge and by requiring the members to report to the QCIC
the audit guidance which in their judgment might have avoided the alle
gations made against the firm.

Lim itations o f P resen t Audit Guidance
To understand the Board's recommendations, it is important to outline the
limitations of the audit guidance presently available to the profession. By
definition, auditing standards define, and provide guidance with respect
to, the nature and extent of auditors' responsibilities; they should not, and
usually do not, specify guidance on what procedures are appropriate or
inappropriate in specific circumstances. Through its standard-setting or
ganization, the auditing profession has produced a comprehensive set of
auditing standards and interpretations of those standards.
What is missing are specifics: a) examples of possible fraudulent
practices linked to precisely targeted auditing guidance and rooted in an
analysis of allegations of audit failure; and b) the identification of auditing
practices that require reconsideration or the development of guidance so
they are consistently applied. This guidance could be issued in a manner
similar to the guidance issued in the accounting area by the Financial Ac
counting Standards Board's Emerging Issues Task Force. This guidance
should direct attention to business, accounting and auditing practices that
pose new or special problems for auditors.
The following are examples of situations identified through the
analysis of QCIC cases where such guidance might be appropriate:
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■

As a result of an analysis of management fraud perpetrated in
part through the use of photocopied invoices, one auditing firm's
policy manual instructs the auditor to check the authenticity of
documents and to accept only original documents as corrobora
tive audit evidence. The Board believes all firms should do this.

■

In several instances, auditors failed to discover or identify con
cealed "bill and hold" arrangements used by the client to inap
propriately recognize revenue. Audit staff who had examined
shipping documents may have failed to question the location to
which the goods were shipped. Guidance should be provided to
the audit staff to routinely examine shipping destinations on
sales invoices and to be alert to shipments to locations other than
the customer's premises as a possible clue to "bill and hold"
transactions.

■

The question of whether physical counts of retail and other in
ventories on a test basis constitute reliable evidential matter
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when the client knows where the tests are going to be conducted
needs to be addressed.
■

Auditing literature does not provide any guidance on whether
the auditor should be responsible for opening cartons, examining
contents, and testing inventory for adherence to technical specifi
cations. Whether this is appropriate is debatable; that it should
be addressed is not.

Examples like these, coming as they do from alleged audit failures,
point to matters that the profession needs to address and resolve.
The Board believes that member firms should report to the QCIC any
standards or guidance implications identified during their internal analy
ses of allegedly failed audits so the QCIC can evaluate th ese findings,
along with those identified by the QCIC's own proceedings, and see that
appropriate guidance is published. In this way the profession can pool
the knowledge it gains on an individual basis concerning the causes and
circumstances of alleged audit failures and gain from it as a profession,
just as, for instance, all airline operators and all airplane manufacturers
learn from the investigations of the NTSB and make changes in airline
procedures or in airplane construction reflecting the new knowledge.
In determining means of implementing this recommendation, the le
gitimate concerns of firms with respect to the weakening of their position
in pending litigation must be recognized. However, the Board under
stands that some firms provide such guidance in writing to their own pro
fessionals. Since such internal documents would, in any event, be
subpoenable in litigation, the Board does not believe making such infor
mation available more broadly would significantly affect a firm's litiga
tion posture.
Notwithstanding the acknowledged value of the QCIC's present proce
dures in quickly identifying and addressing major quality control deficien
cies, the Board believes that measures can be taken which would better
assure the public that firms and the self-regulatory process are taking steps to
protect the public from future audit failures by examining past ones.

Recommendation
The SEC Practice Section's membership requirem ents should be
changed to require member firm s to m odify their quality control
systems to specify that they take the following steps in response to
allegations of deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of financial
statem ents of an SEC client (or another client encompassed by the
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QCIC process) that are made in litigation against the member firm
or its personnel, or in any public proceeding or investigation by a
regulatory agency:
(1) Perform a complete internal analysis of the audit; review all
relevant work papers, correspondence and other files;
interview members of the engagement team.
(2) Assess the capabilities of the senior audit personnel and
determine whether the firm should m onitor, reassign or
terminate such personnel.
(3) Identify any problems with the firm 's quality control system or
training activities.
(4) Identify any implications of the allegations relating to the
adequacy of auditing, quality control or accounting standards.
(5) Identify any im plications of the allegations relating to the
adequacy of guidance w ith respect to the manner in which
audits are conducted, including the evaluation of risks in
audits, and relating to variations in practice and the
interpretations of standards that should be resolved.
(6) Communicate the im plications identified in items (4) and (5) in
a structured manner to the QCIC.
Recommendation III-2:
The peer review performance standards should be amended to re
quire peer reviewers to test firm s' compliance w ith these m odifica
tions to their quality control systems.
Recommendation III-3:
The QCIC procedures should be m odified to require the QCIC to
develop additional procedures to perm it it, on the basis of its analy
sis of the QCIC cases and the inform ation reported to it under the
expanded membership requirements discussed above, to facilitate
the resolution of unresolved audit practice issues and to form ulate,
either by itself or in collaboration w ith other appropriate bodies,
practice and guidance directions to the accounting profession in a
retrievable form at such as EITF Abstracts, which present issues
considered by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Emerg
ing Issues Task Force.
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CHAPTER IV
IMPROVEMENTS TO STANDARDS FO R
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND AUD IT REPORTS
This chapter discusses factors that have led to an erosion o f public
confidence in the accounting profession, the "expectation gap," and
provides some facts about financial statements and audits. This chapter
also proposes recommendations for changes in standards to make financial
statements and audit reports more understandable and useful.
C onfidence in th e P rofession and th e “E xp ectatio n Gap”
The accounting profession has suffered a serious erosion of public confi
dence: confidence in its standards, in the relevance of its work and in
the financial reporting process. The reasons for this are not hard to
identify. In some cases, not long before an entity failed, it received an audi
tor's report giving no indication that the entity was in its latter days. How
could it be, the intelligent and thoughtful layman asks, that the bank or other
business was so near its demise and the auditors could not see it?
Many have also been concerned about the failure of auditors to de
tect alleged management fraud in a number of highly publicized cases in
which auditors have been named as defendants. The Phar-Mor, Comp
tronix, College Bound, Cascade International and MiniScribe cases come
quickly to mind. Many believe that a carefully planned and executed
audit would have detected the alleged fraud.
Public confidence has been affected by the unpleasant fact that failed
audits do occur. Audits are performed by people, and not all people are
at their best all the time. A brilliant lawyer occasionally gives his client
poor advice. A distinguished musician is not always at the top of his
form. A professor known for his expository skills may deliver a flat lec
ture. Accountants and auditors also at times fail — no matter the extent of
help their firms' quality control programs provide them.
Much of this erosion of confidence has been inextricably linked with
the business and economic history of the 1980s.
LBOs, MBOs and other ingenious ways of restructuring enterprises
resulted in complicated financial arrangements that often sowed the seeds
of corporate disaster and taxed the skills of auditors.
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The deregulation of the financial industry led to new ways of doing
business that stretched the ability of the accounting profession to keep up
with the changes. New financial instruments proliferated, each presenting
novel accounting challenges. It was difficult to determine how these as
sets and liabilities should be measured and classified. Financial regulators
often tolerated non-traditional financial reporting practices to help the in
stitutions under their authority stay open. The problems were com
pounded by the vast devaluation of property values which made
shambles of many financial institutions' balance sheets. These develop
ments created enormous problems for management and for accounting
firms which were trying to value complex assets and account for transac
tions which they had never seen before.
All of these developments created huge risks for investors, lenders
and auditors. Not surprisingly there were more bankruptcies and busi
ness failures than had been seen since the Great Depression of the 1930s.
Much of the litigation referred to earlier in this Report arose out of the fail
ures which flowed from these enormous risks taken during the 1980s by
investors and creditors.
In many cases traditional financial reporting was unequal to the chal
lenges posed. Often difficult accounting decisions had to be made for
which there were no clear precedents. When many of the enterprises that
participated in the euphoria of the "booming 80s" paid the price of their
excesses, the auditor was usually among those charged with some in
volvement in the failure.
The events of the 1980s widened the "expectation gap" that was identi
fied and described in the Report of the Commission on Auditors' Responsi
bilities (the Cohen Commission). In that report, the Commission said:
A number of surveys have been taken to determine what the pub
lic, or knowledgeable segments of it, expect of the independent
auditor and how they interpret the audit function. Users of finan
cial statements expect auditors to penetrate into company affairs,
to exert surveillance over management, and to take an active part
in improving the quality and extent of financial disclosure. In all
of these areas, users seem to expect more than they believe they
are receiving from the auditors. . . . Some segments of the public
have an erroneous impression of the auditor's role. Several expec
tations are neither feasible to meet nor practical from a cost-effec
21
tiveness standpoint.
21
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Since that report, the "expectation gap" has been extensively dis
cussed in this country, the United Kingdom, Canada and other countries
as well. The Commission to Study the Public's Expectations of Audits (the
Macdonald Commission), created by the Canadian Institute of Chartered
Accountants, pointed out that the "expectation gap" has a number of com
ponents. It wisely distinguished the "reasonable" public expectations
from the "unreasonable" ones, and the "actual" shortfall in the perform
ance of auditors from the "perceived" shortfall.
The Board believes these distinctions are useful in analyzing the "ex
pectation gap" and the erosion of public confidence in the profession.
For instance, the Board believes it is unreasonable for users of
audited financial statements to expect auditors to guarantee the honesty
and integrity of the information contained in them. Similarly, auditors
should not be expected to warrant that management is honest, competent,
or honorable, or that the business will prosper or continue indefinitely in
existence.
While the Board believes that a better understanding of the limits of
financial statements and audits can do much to close the expectation gap,
like the Cohen Commission, the Board believes the principal obligation
for closing the gap rests with the profession and that only improved per
formance and an expansion of its responsibilities can close the gap to the
extent necessary if the profession is to serve the public interest and satisfy
the reasonable expectations of users of financial statements.
The Board believes that the users of audited financial statements
must obtain some measure of additional assurance that the company's af
fairs are being conducted in accordance with specified laws (to the extent
auditors have the ability to make such judgments); that the company's in
ternal controls meet the criteria recently adopted by the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the National Commission on Fraudulent Fi
nancial Reporting; and that management is not manipulating its financial
reports or committing other frauds.22
The Board believes the "expectation gap" can be narrowed and pub
lic confidence in the profession can be enhanced if:

Recommendations 1-2 (1978) [hereinafter Cohen Commission].
22

It is interesting to note that until late in the last century detection of fraud was
perceived by auditors, as well as their clients, as the principal purpose of an audit.
Sikka, Puxty, Willmott & Cooper, Eliminating the Expectations Gap? 11-18 (1992).
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1. The profession improves its standards and practices, including
particularly its ability to detect management fraud; and
2. Users of audited financial statements understand the inherent
limitations of those statements through better disclosure.
With the hope of perhaps reducing the " unreasonable" expectations
of users of audited financial information, the Board next discusses the
characteristics of financial statements and audits and what users can rea
sonably expect from them. Subsequent sections of this chapter recom
mend measures which standard setters can take to improve
understanding of the limitations of financial statements and the account
ant's reports thereon. Chapter V includes recommendations intended to
improve and strengthen the profession's performance.

Som e Facts About Fin an cial Statem ents and Audits
Users of financial statements need to understand the nature of these state
ments, the limitations of GAAP, and the significance of the auditor's opin
ion. The "expectation gap" must be narrowed from the user's end as well
as the auditor's. The Board offers the following brief explanation as a
means of helping users understand the limitations of financial statements
and audits.
Financial Statements —
are prepared under the control of the management of the re
porting company;
are a mixture of hard data and uncertain estimates:
The accuracy of the estimates in financial statements gen
erally depends on future events and developments.
The transactions that generate financial data and the ne
cessity of estimates vary from simple to complex, repeti
tive to unique, few to multitudinous, familiar to
innovative.
depend for their usefulness and reliability on the extent and
quality of the controls within the company and the knowl
edge, skill and integrity of company officers and employees;
may rapidly decline in their relevance and reliability because
of changing conditions within and without the reporting
company or as a result of the continuing flow of transactions
and other events that affect the company; and
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are only one of the many kinds of information necessary to
make an informed judgment of the risk involved in an invest
ment in, or extension of credit to, the reporting company.
An Audit in Accordance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards In
cludes—
an understanding and assessment by the auditor of the re
porting company's internal controls to assess audit risk and
to determine the extent of audit procedures;
an assessment of the likelihood that circumstances and condi
tions may induce officers or employees to make inappropri
ate or misleading financial presentations;
a comparison of samples of the asserted facts in the financial
statements with documentary and other relevant evidence of
transactions, events and conditions;
a review of the adequacy and appropriateness of manage
ment's assumptions about the future in arriving at estimates,
and the appropriateness and apparent reasonableness of the
reported estimates;
a search for material errors and irregularities in the financial
statements; and
a responsible, professional, technical opinion on whether the
financial statements examined present fairly, in all material
respects, the financial position and the results of operations
and cash flows of the entity in compliance with GAAP.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles —
are best understood as general instructions at a given point in
time for the fair presentation of a company's financial posi
tion and results of operations;
have been developed over time and from broad experience;
take into consideration: (1) the nature of financial statements;
(2) the difficulty of measuring financial position and the re
sults of operations for active participants in a competitive,
uncertain market economy; and (3) the important differences
among enterprises, their situations, activities and conditions;
do not and cannot provide rules for measuring or disclosing
every possible transaction in which enterprises engage or
events to which they are subject; and
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because of the care essential in developing appropriate stand
ards, unavoidably lag behind the innovativeness of entrepre
neurs and those who advise them.
An Audit Cannot Assure that —
the information reported in the financial statements will lead
to successful investments; or
the operating results and the financial condition reported in
the audited financial statements will continue into the indefi
nite future.
Auditors' Opinions —
are directed to whether the auditor believes that the financial
statements present fairly, in all material respects, the financial
position and the results of operations and cash flows of the
entity in compliance with GAAP, as of the date stated therein,
not to the health, welfare and future success of the reporting
enterprise.
The above summary demonstrates that the accounting and auditing
process has inherent serious limitations. It would be desirable if such limita
tions did not exist; nevertheless, they do and they cannot be eliminated. Nei
ther accountants nor auditors, nor anyone else, possess the expertise that
would permit them to eliminate the uncertainties inherent in the estimates in
financial statements or to forecast the future with unerring accuracy.
Recognizing this, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB") should develop a brief statement to accompany all financial
statements prepared in accordance with GAAP that would indicate clearly
the varying degrees of reliability of the information contained in the finan
cial statements. Many users of financial statements do not sufficiently dis
tinguish "hard" factual assertions from estimates and value assertions
whose accuracy is largely dependent upon future events.

Recommendation IV-1:
The FASB should add to its agenda a project to design a brief state
ment explaining the limitations of financial statements. The expla
nation should be made a part of every set of financial statements
described as being "in accordance with generally accepted account
ing principles."
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C riticism s o f th e C urrent A ccounting Model
Another cause of erosion in the public's confidence in accounting is the in
creasing current criticism of the accounting model. When the FASB devel
oped its "conceptual framework," some believed that the FASB was
erecting a foundation of definitions oriented to the balance sheet, thus im
plying that a balance sheet (value) approach should displace the present
income statement approach to accounting theory. That approach gave
proponents of value accounting new life. However, the FASB reached no
conclusion about whether financial statement amounts should be re
corded at historical cost or current market values, and the m atter remains
unresolved to this date.
The FASB currently does not have a comprehensive project to decide
the possible merits of value reporting, although such reporting is being
considered with respect to certain assets in an FASB Exposure Draft is
sued in September 1992, "Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and
Equity Securities." Such current FASB projects as "Accounting by Credi
tors for Impairment of a Loan" and "Impairment of Long-Lived Assets,
Identifiable Intangibles, and Goodwill" indicate the understandable diffi
culty that the FASB has in departing from transaction prices in measuring
the information reported in financial statements.
It is entirely possible that comprehensive value reporting may not be
suitable as a substitute for transaction prices in the accounting model.
However, as long as the matter remains unsettled, those who argue for
this substitution are encouraged to continue their criticisms with the result
that users of financial reports are confused. Users don't understand why
accountants cannot make up their minds.
As long as a constant flow of criticism directed at the present ac
counting model appears in journals and is espoused in speeches, the pub
lic will remain confused and its confidence in accounting will decrease.
The Board takes no position on the issue of value based versus historical
cost based accounting. It is, however, firmly in favor of having the issue
resolved. Accordingly, the Board urges the FASB to deal with this m atter
comprehensively and immediately.
The Board understands that the AICPA has appointed a committee
to study the future of financial reporting to better satisfy the needs of us
ers in the future; so has the Financial Executives Institute. The Association
for Investment Management and Research has recently issued a position
paper entitled "Financial Reporting in the 1990's and Beyond."
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Recommendation IV-2:
The FASB should add to its agenda a project to study comprehen
sively the possibility of requiring the reporting of values and
changes in values rather than historical transaction prices, either as
a basis to propose changes to financial accounting standards or to
explain publicly why such a change in accounting standards is im
practical or otherwise inappropriate. In carrying out this effort, the
FASB should consider and take into account the conclusions of the
AICPA, the Financial Executives Institute and the Association for
Investment Management and Research studies with respect to the
future of financial reporting.

Risks and U ncertainties
Many believe that adequate disclosures relating to risks and uncertainties
are envisioned by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5,
"Accounting for Contingencies," but the fact is that neither preparers nor
auditors interpret that standard in a way that results in a clear statement
from management describing the nature and extent of material risks and
uncertainties. Financial statements as now prepared fall short in disclos
ing risks and uncertainties. The AICPA's Accounting Standards Executive
Committee has developed a draft Statement of Position on disclosures in
financial statements about risks and uncertainties that was recently
cleared by the FASB for public exposure.
The Board believes that this matter is of vital importance. Although,
to the Board's knowledge, no empirical research has been done to confirm
this, it is the Board's belief that, had this statement been in effect before
the thrift institution debacle, some of the charges made against thrift insti
tutions and their auditors would have been avoided.

Recommendation IV-3:
The AICPA's Accounting Standards Executive Committee should
promptly adopt a Statement of Position providing guidance on, and
requiring disclosure of information about, the nature of risks and
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uncertainties associated with the reporting entity's operations and
financial condition.

R eporting o n Sensitive A ccounting Estim ates
The sufficiency and competence of evidential matter available to auditors
to assess managements' assertions about sensitive valuation judgments
and other estimates often do not reduce audit risk sufficiently to justify
the degree of assurance provided in the auditor's report on historical fi
nancial statements. Many of these valuation judgments and estimates are
the equivalent of a financial forecast and are based primarily on condi
tions expected to exist in the future and courses of action management ex
pects to take. The following is an example.
The evidential matter available to the auditor to support a judgment
about the carrying value of a financial institution's loan or equity partici
pation in a real estate project under development is limited primarily to
an evaluation of: (a) the developer's reputation and financial stability
(which is usually dependent on the success of the project being consid
ered); (b) assumptions on the marketability of the project; and (c) whether
costs incurred to date are within budget.
If the auditor were requested to provide assurance to a third party in
a separate financial presentation, this presentation would be cast as a fi
nancial forecast and the auditor's report would include a caveat that the
prospective results are dependent on assumptions that may not be
achieved. But the same situation when included in an historical financial
statement usually results in the auditor expressing a clean opinion on the
financial statements, including the valuation of this very uncertain project.
This variation in auditor assurance for similar situations cannot be
justified. The financial collapse of many financial institutions resulted di
rectly from their equity participations in, and loans to, real estate projects.
The auditor's assurances about the value of these projects were the same
as the assurances provided on the carrying value of the cash account,
rather than the assurance that would accompany a forecast.

Recommendation IV-4:
The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor's standard
report to make the prospective nature of certain accounting esti
mates clear, including a caveat that the estimated results may not be
achieved. This communication should not be written as a defen
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sive retrenchment by the auditing profession, but rather as a more
realistic and reasonable explanation of the limitation of assurance
that can be provided on certain accounting estimates.

In making these recommendations, the Board urges those involved
to be ever alert to the dangers of creating expectations that cannot realisti
cally be fulfilled by accounting and auditing. Efforts to assure that regula
tors, financial statement users and the general public have a sound
understanding of what accounting and auditing can and cannot do will
do much to answer allegations that accountants and auditors have failed
in meeting public expectations.
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CHAPTER V
O TH ER RECOMMENDATIONS TO IM PROVE AND
STRENGTHEN PERFORM ANCE
This chapter includes recommendations intended to improve the
profession's performance by enhancing its capacity and willingness to
detect fraud, strengthening professionalism and independence and by
improving financial reporting.
his chapter is not intended to set forth an exhaustive set of recom
mendations directed at improving public confidence in the account
ing profession. There are other proposals for reform of the profession
being discussed in this country and abroad which are not included here.
Some would restructure the profession in radical ways, e.g., there is a pro
posal by a group in the United Kingdom that companies not be permitted
to select their auditors or negotiate their fees. The Board rejects this ex
treme proposal as unnecessary in this country.

T

However, the auditing profession must aggressively strengthen its
role and performance in a rapidly changing society. If it does that, the
" expectation gap" will surely narrow, the risks of litigation will recede
and public confidence in the profession will increase.
The Board emphasizes that the process of improving public confi
dence in the profession must be ongoing. The profession should be con
stantly alert to ways to improve its performance and financial reporting
and should be alert to areas where attest skills can improve the reliability
of information provided to regulators and the public. The following rec
ommendations are a start toward the goal of improved professional per
formance and improved financial reporting.

R ecom m endations to Enh ance th e D etection o f
M anagem ent Fraud
There has been considerable publicity about a number of recent alleged
management frauds resulting in financial misstatements which have con
cealed financial distress or irregularities and have contributed to substan
tial economic losses by investors and creditors. These frauds have eroded
the public's confidence in the audit function. Many observers question
the value of an audit that does not detect material intentional misstate
ments.
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No problem confronting the profession is as demanding, or as diffi
cult to resolve, as the problem of management fraud and its detection by
auditors. Before the turn of the century both auditors and users of
audited financial information regarded the detection of fraud as one of the
primary purposes of an audit. For many reasons the profession has
moved from acceptance of that purpose to the view that its role in detect
ing fraud is secondary to the other purposes of audits. In contrast, the
public has continued to regard fraud detection as an important goal of the
audit process — and now attaches even greater importance to that goal.
Auditing standards were strengthened in 1989 to require auditors,
when performing an audit, to assess the risk that management fraud may
cause the financial statements to be materially misstated. Based on that
assessment, auditors are then required to design the audit and " exercise . .
. the proper degree of professional skepticism to achieve reasonable assur
ance that material errors or irregularities will be detected."23
However,
even a properly planned audit may not discover an entanglement of falsi
fied records and documents or collusion between client personnel and
third parties or among management and employees of the client — all of
which are expressly designed to mislead the auditor. Moreover, when
performing an audit the auditor does not have the benefit of investigatory
subpoena power to discover fraud. Nor is the auditor able to threaten
criminal or civil proceedings or draconian prison sentences to get admis
sions from at least some of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, the Board be
lieves that the auditing standard, if properly implemented and followed,
could enhance the detection of fraud. However, the Board understands
that auditors are not consistently complying with this standard, and they
are not sufficiently sensitive to the requirement that they exercise the
proper degree of professional skepticism.
The Board believes there are other measures that can be taken to im
prove performance in this difficult area. The Board believes that, to a
greater extent than it now does, the profession must accept responsibility
for the detection of fraud by management. The profession cannot, and it
cannot be expected to, develop methods that will assure that every fraud,
no matter how cleverly contrived, will be unearthed in the course of the
audit, but it must develop means of increasing significantly the likelihood
of detecting fraud. Adoption of the Board's recommendation to expand
the QCIC's mission to include a more careful analysis of the factors con-

23
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tributing to failed audits should lead to improved guidance to the profes
sion on the detection of fraud. The Board also recommends that the pro
fession develop comprehensive guidelines to further assist auditors in
identifying symptoms that indicate the heightened likelihood of manage
ment fraud involving the manipulation of financial information and spec
ify additional audit procedures when such symptoms appear. This
undertaking should be broad in scope and include the development of
guidance to facilitate the analysis of both financial data and non-financial
factors that may be indicative of management fraud.

Recommendation V-1:
Accounting firms should assure that auditors more consistently im
plement, and be more sensitive to the need to exercise the profes
sional skepticism required by, the auditing standard that provides
guidance on the auditor's responsibility to detect and report errors
and irregularities.
Recommendation V-2:
The Auditing Standards Board, the Executive Committee of the
SEC Practice Section or some other appropriate body should de
velop guidelines to assist auditors in assessing the likelihood that
management fraud which may affect financial information may be
occurring and to specify additional auditing procedures when there
is a heightened likelihood of management fraud.

R ecom m endations to Strengthen Independence
and Professionalism
Advocacy in Relationships with Clients
Some of the criticism levelled at auditors implies that observers of the pro
fession see the auditor as less than objective and independent. The Board
urges the profession to give this subject its prompt attention.
As a start, the Board suggests that auditors consider the distinction
between client advocacy and client service. Client advocacy might best be
understood as a matter of attitude, a willingness to serve the immediate
interests of the client company, or its management, in any way requested
as long as the law permits that activity. Client service means serving the
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client company's best interests without coming into conflict with profes
sional standards, the best interests of the audit function, or the auditor's
best judgment.
Developing such a distinction and incorporating it into the profes
sion's Code of Professional Conduct could do much to prevent any dimi
nution of the auditor's independence.
Partners and staff members must be reminded constantly that the
firm's reputation for independence is far more valuable than the fees ob
tained from any client. When firms were smaller and the firm's senior
management could know every partner personally, the inculcation of pro
fessional attributes was a different matter than it is today. The sheer size
of firms reduces the intimate knowledge that senior management once
had of every partner. Without that knowledge, personnel evaluations be
come less personal and more statistical.
As a practical matter, independence depends largely on judgments
made by the audit partners on the job. If partners are judged solely, or
even primarily, on the basis of hours and dollars billed, the audit partner
faced with a client who is demanding advocacy is not in the best position
to uphold the firm's reputation for independence and objectivity. Mecha
nisms to aid and protect the partner faced with such decisions now exist
within many firms engaged in auditing. Concurring partner review is one
of them; requiring consultation is another. However, the Board believes
that programs to strengthen the desire of each audit partner to protect the
firm's independence are so important that constant review of the efficacy
of these mechanisms, and their improvement where necessary, is a must.

Recommendation V-3:
The AICPA should undertake a project to sharpen further the dis
tinction between client advocacy and client service and incorporate
that distinction into the profession's Code of Professional Conduct.
Individual accounting firms should constantly review their pro
grams regarding client advocacy and client service to strengthen the
desire of each audit partner to protect the firm's independence.

Client Advocacy with Standard Setters and Regulators
Stephen A. Zeff, a well-known accounting academic, has identified one
form of client advocacy that he views as inappropriate — CPA firms act
ing as "hired guns" for their audit clients by helping them present their
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views to the FASB.24 The Board is less troubled by this service — ghost
writing has long been an honorable profession — than by what some per
ceive as more pernicious developments; namely, allowing the views of
major clients to bias a firm's ostensibly independent response to FASB dis
cussion memoranda, invitations to comment and exposure drafts or to in
fluence a firm to not take a contentious and complex issue to the
Emerging Issues Task Force because of concern about getting the "w rong"
answer. To the extent this more subtle and covert kind of client advocacy
exists, it damages the standard-setting process and the interpretive proc
ess by denying those processes benefits that would otherwise be obtained
from objective, well-reasoned and well-researched analyses of the issues.
The mere perception that it exists damages the profession by lessening the
regard that standard setters and the public have for auditors' inde
pendence, objectivity, and professionalism.
A belief that clients were able to unduly influence the views of auditing
firm partners who sat on the Accounting Principles Board contributed to that
organization's demise and replacement with the Financial Accounting Stand
ards Board in the early 1970s. The problem is not a new one.
However, the Board's inquiries lead it to believe that while client ad
vocacy of the nature described does on occasion occur, it is less frequent
than critics think. Critics must realize that considering the thoughtful
views of clients as well as others in reaching informed professional deci
sions about complex accounting issues is legitimate and proper; it should
not be surprising that firms and their clients, even major clients, fre
quently arrive at similar conclusions independently.

Recommendation V-4:
Accounting firms should take special care to ensure that their par
ticipation in the standard setting process is characterized by objec
tivity and professionalism. Standard setters and leaders of the
profession should discuss and address the issues related to client
advocacy in the standard setting process and establish ways of
identifying and correcting aberrant behavior when it occurs.

24

Stephen A. Zeff, The Decline of Professionalism, 98 De Acct. NR (Netherlands) 264,
264-67 (Jan. 1992).
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Another potential for inappropriate advocacy on accounting matters
occurs when an auditor supports a client's accounting policy with the SEC
staff and that policy is clearly an unreasonable application of generally ac
cepted accounting principles or is otherwise at odds with the economic re
ality of the underlying event or transaction. The Board has been advised
that in most instances where this has occurred, it is typically the engage
ment partner who has acted as the client's advocate, and has done so
without the benefit of appropriate consultation within his or her firm. The
advocacy in these cases represents one individual's attitude and bias.
When this type of unprofessional behavior occurs, it should be corrected
by the firms involved.
The Board also believes that the SEC staff should recognize that there
are many accounting issues on which reasonable people may disagree —
that not every policy with which the staff disagrees is necessarily an in
stance of "creative" or "incredible" accounting or "clearly" at odds with
the economic reality of a transaction. It is frequently in the public interest
for clients with their auditors to discuss with the SEC staff the resolution
of complex or unaddressed accounting issues.
The Board believes that both types of client advocacy it has described
have the potential for reducing both the fact and appearance of objectivity
and independence in performing audits; they also lower the perception of
professionalism that standard setters, regulators and the public have of
auditors. While the Board knows of no way to legislate objectivity and
professionalism, it urges the leaders of the accounting profession to be
constantly on the alert to this problem and to remind their colleagues peri
odically of the importance of manifesting objectivity and professionalism.

Recommendation V-5:
Firm s' consultation policies and procedures should ensure that cli
ent accounting issues are not discussed w ith SEC staff w ithout the
benefit of consultation at the appropriate level w ithin the firm .

R ecom m endations to Im prove Fin an cial R eporting
Determination of Accounting Treatment
In many situations, accounting standard setters have not specified the ap
propriate method of accounting for a particular event or transaction. As a
result, more than one accounting method appears to be available and ac
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ceptable and at least a reasonable basis may exist for each of them. The
views of management and the auditor may differ as to which of the per
missible methods is preferable and management may not always be
guided solely by a desire to provide a reliable financial report.
The Cohen Commission recognized that "deciding among alterna
tives in the absence of specific guidance is admittedly difficult," but it
went on to note that "there are many examples of auditors relying on ob
jective bases and making such judgments with skill and competence."25
The Macdonald Commission of Canada expressed its belief that "the audi
tor has a particular responsibility, when faced with situations for which
there is no clear precedent, to be satisfied that the accounting proposed is
reasonable in relation to the substance or economic reality of the thing or
transaction accounted for."26
In these situations, the U.S. auditing literature provides that the audi
tor "should consider whether the substance of transactions or events dif
fers materially from their form " and, when possible, "to account for the
[new type of] event or transaction on the basis of its substance by selecting
an accounting principle that appears appropriate when applied in a man
ner similar to the application of an established principle to an analogous
event or transaction."27
The Board believes that further emphasis on the appropriate applica
tion of accounting policies is needed.
When the need to select an accounting treatm ent arises in the con
text of an event or transaction that is new to a particular enterprise, the
audit partner frequently, either as a m atter of firm policy or voluntar
ily, consults with accounting experts at the office, regional or national
level, as appropriate. In fact, the SEC Practice Section requires its mem
bers to adhere to the AICPA's quality control standards which provide,
among other things, that "[p ]olicies and procedures for consultation
should be established to provide the firm with reasonable assurance
that personnel will seek assistance, to the extent required, from persons
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Cohen Commission, supra, at 19.
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Report of the Commission to Study the Public's Expectations of Auditors, Toronto:
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 58 (1988) [hereinafter Macdonald
Report].
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having appropriate levels of knowledge, com petence, judgm ent, and
authority."28
Effective policies and procedures for consultation are more than a
matter of complying with the quality control standards; they are also good
business. Accounting firms should view the consultation process as the
last line of defense on accounting issues that could be a cause of sub
sequent litigation. The Board's review of cases of alleged audit failure
studied by the QCIC in recent years indicates that in many such cases con
sultation on accounting matters had occurred and the matters had been
extensively considered and debated. In too many cases, however, the
preference of client management — influenced at least in part by objec
tives other than producing the most reliable financial reporting possible in
the circumstances — nevertheless prevailed over the preference of the
auditing or consulting partner.
Implementation of the Macdonald Commission's recommendation
relating to "economic substance" will be difficult without the benefit of
hindsight. But it is clear that an accountant cannot identify "economic
substance" if those whose views are sought in the consultation process do
not know all the relevant facts and circumstances when giving their ad
vice. QCIC inquiries suggest that this has happened on at least several oc
casions.
Among the membership requirements of the SEC Practice Section is
second partner review of audits. This requirement has been strengthened
through the years, largely at the behest of the Board. The Board is frankly
puzzled as to why, if a truly thorough second partner review is conducted
objectively, financial statements reflect some of the accounting judgments
it sees as a result of its overview of the QCIC's activities.

Recommendation V-6:
The follow ing recommendation of the M acdonald Commission
should be adopted by the Auditing Standards Board in the United
States:
W hen new accounting policies are adopted in response to new
types of transactions or new kinds of assets or obligations, the

28
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auditor should be satisfied that the accounting policies adopted
properly reflect the economic substance of the transaction, asset,
or liability in accordance w ith the broad theory governing pre
sent-day financial reporting and the established concept of con
29
servatism in the face of uncertainty.
Recommendation V-7:
Peer reviewers should evaluate the consultation process by which
specific accounting conclusions are reached, as they do now, and
should also inquire wheth er that process leads to accounting that is
appropriate in the circum stances. In testing com pliance w ith the
consultation policies and procedures in a firm , the peer review
team should evaluate the quality of the conclusions reached.
Recommendation V-8:
The concurring partner, whose participation in an audit is a mem
bership requirem ent of the SEC Practice Section, should be respon
sible for assuring that those consulted on accounting m atters are
aware of all of the relevant facts and circum stances, including an
understanding of the financial statements in whose context the ac
counting policy is being considered. The concurring and consult
ing partners should know enough about the client to ensure that all
of the relevant facts and circumstances are m arshalled, and also
possess the increased detachment that comes from not having to
face the client on an ongoing basis. The concurring partner should
have the responsibility to conclude whether the accounting treat
m ent applied is consistent w ith the objectives of Recommendation
V-6.

Corporate Governance
As the Treadway Commission rightly recognized, responsibility for
fraudulent financial reporting does not rest only, or even principally, with
the auditor. Every fraudulent financial statement for which an auditor
has been held responsible was prepared by executives who were inten
tionally committing a fraud, not only upon their shareholders, investors
and the markets, but also on the auditor as well. The responsibility of cor
porate boards and their audit committees for the integrity of management

29

Macdonald Report, supra, at 59.
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and financial reports should be pinpointed and reinforced and the appro
priate authorities should adopt measures to assure that it is.
In the United Kingdom, the financial statements of a corporation are
deemed to be the directors' statements. Because of the difficulties of
maintaining litigation in that country against directors, directors have
been willing to accept this responsibility. In the United States, the finan
cial statements of an enterprise are statements of the entity. Directors may
in some circumstances be liable for fraudulent or incorrect financial state
ments; however, rarely have there been holdings to that effect. The SEC
requires that a majority of the directors of an issuer sign the Form 10-K
which includes the issuer's audited financial statements; it is doubtful,
however, whether this exposes directors to additional liabilities.
Most major publicly held corporations today have audit committees.
A recent Korn/F erry survey of 322 companies revealed that 98% of those
responding had audit committees. The three major securities markets in
this country — the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Ex
change, and NASDAQ/NMS — all require listed companies to have audit
committees made up entirely of outside directors or with a majority of
outside directors.
In most corporations the responsibility for scrutiny of financial state
ments has been delegated by boards to their audit committees. The expe
rience of the members of the Board indicates that in too many instances
the audit committees do not perform their duties adequately and in many
cases do not understand their responsibilities.
The Institute of Internal Auditors has embarked on a project to iden
tify and publicize the best audit committee practices. The Board applauds
this and hopes that this will provide clear and comprehensive guidance to
audit committees in discharging their oversight responsibilities. Until that
study is completed, the Board urges all audit committees to evaluate the
scope and adequacy of their oversight activities to ensure that they are as
comprehensive as those recommended by the Treadway Commission.
The matrix included as Appendix E should assist audit committees in per
forming such an evaluation. In the Board's opinion, audit committees
should assume defined responsibilities, as outlined in the recommenda
tion set forth below.
To encourage audit committees or boards to fulfill such responsibili
ties and to inform investors whether audit committees or boards perform
those responsibilities, the SEC should require registrants to include in a
document containing the annual financial statements a statement by the
audit committee or the board of directors as to whether its members have
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reviewed the company's audited annual financial statements, have con
ferred with management and the independent auditor concerning them,
have received from the auditor the information required to be communi
cated by the auditor, and believe that the financial statements are com
plete and consistent with information known to them and reflect
appropriate accounting principles. The Commission should reduce the
exposure of members of the audit committee (or board) to liability by in
dicating that the report of the audit committee (or board) will not be
deemed to be "soliciting m aterial" or "filed" for purposes of Section 18 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The recent action of the SEC with re
spect to compensation committee reports is a precedent for this.
The auditor should assist the audit committee and the board in under
standing their responsibilities and the best practices to follow. The auditor
should help the committee to assess its own performance and indicate the ar
eas in which the committee's procedures could be strengthened. Not only
would such auditor activity result in better financial reporting, but it would
also reduce the danger of litigation against the auditor.

Recommendation V-9:
Audit committees (or the board if there is no audit committee)
should assume the following responsibilities relating to an SEC
registrant's preparation of annual financial statements: (a) review
the annual financial statements; (b) confer with management and
the independent auditor about them; (c) receive from the inde
pendent auditor all information that the auditor is required to com 
municate under auditing standards; (d) assess whether the financial
statements are complete and consistent with information known to
them; and (e) assess whether the financial statements reflect appro
priate accounting principles.
Recommendation V-10:
The SEC should require registrants to include in a document con
taining the annual financial statements a statement by the audit
committee (or by the board if there is no audit committee) that de
scribes its responsibilities and tells how they were discharged. This
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1 Codification of Professional Standards, U.S. Auditing Standards (AICPA) § 380.06
- .14, at 465-2 to 466 (July 1992).
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disclosure should state whether the audit committee members (or,
in the absence of an audit committee, the members of the board):
(a) have reviewed the annual financial statements; (b) have con
ferred with management and the independent auditor about them;
(c) have received from the independent auditor all information that
the auditor is required to communicate under auditing standards;
(d) believe that the financial statements are complete and consistent
with information known to them; and (e) believe that the financial
statements reflect appropriate accounting principles.

The Audit Committee and Audit Fees
Often audit committees, in addition to recommending the election of audi
tors to the board of directors, also undertake to negotiate the auditor's fee.
It is believed that on many such occasions the thrust of the committee's
endeavor is to negotiate the lowest possible fee for the entity.
While it is legitimate for an audit committee to try to get a fair bar
gain for the entity, its overriding concern must be the quality of the audit,
not the price charged for it. If an audit fee is negotiated at unrealistically
low levels, it may lead to pressure on the engagement partner to reduce
the cost of doing the audit; this may lead to "short cuts" and staff econo
mies that adversely affect the quality of the audit. Even if the audit com
mittee does not itself negotiate the auditor's fee, it should assure itself that
the fee negotiated by management is fair compensation for a comprehen
sive and competent audit and will not impair the integrity of the audit.
Audit firms have a related obligation to refuse to perform audit services
for fees that may compromise the integrity of the audit.

Recommendation V-11:
The audit committee or the board of directors should be satisfied
that the audit fee negotiated by it or management for the entity's
audit is sufficient to assure the entity will receive a comprehensive
and complete audit.

Reporting on Internal Control
There is considerable enthusiasm in this country on the part of regulators
and others for requiring corporate managements to include with their an
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nual financial statements an evaluation of the reporting company's inter
nal controls. The SEC has an outstanding proposal which would require
that management include in its annual report to security holders and its
annual report on Form 10-K, among other things, an assessment as of the
end of the most recent fiscal year of the effectiveness of the company's
system of internal control and a statement as to how management has re
sponded to any significant recommendations concerning the system of in
ternal control which its internal auditors and independent accountants
have made. Earlier versions of proposed legislation relating to financial
fraud detection and disclosure included a provision that would have re
quired independent accountants to evaluate whether their clients' internal
accounting controls reasonably ensured, among other things, that receipts
and expenditures are recorded and accounted for properly.
Present audit standards call for a review of internal controls to assess
audit risk and to determine the extent of audit procedures. This review of
internal controls is neither sufficient nor intended to provide a basis for
the evaluation of the quality of the client's system of internal control.
The difficulties that management would experience in complying
with the SEC's proposal and that the profession would face in complying
with the legislative proposal are gradually being removed. The Commit
tee of Sponsoring Organizations (those which sponsored the National
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting) recently published Inter
nal Control — Integrated Framework which provides guidance on the
components of a good system of internal controls over financial reporting.
The AICPA's Auditing Standards Board is preparing performance and re
porting standards for engagements providing for assurances about man
agement assertions on internal controls over financial reporting.
When the Auditing Standards Board project is finished, it will be fea
sible to ask management to make a statement about the company's inter
nal controls and for the auditor to comment on that statement. The Board
believes that the SEC should then adopt the rule it has proposed for man
agement reports on internal controls and, in addition, require auditors to
express an opinion on m anagem ent's assertions. The Board believes that
requiring auditors to assess m anagem ent's reports on the quality of inter
nal controls will benefit the public. First, the auditing profession's evalu
ation of internal control systems will lead to improvements in those
systems. Second, as long as companies' boards and top management de
mand conformity with those systems, the improved systems will make
management fraud and manipulation of financial reporting more difficult.
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Recommendation V-12:
The SEC should require registrants to include in a document con
taining the annual financial statements: (a) a report by manage
ment on the effectiveness of the entity's internal control system
relating to financial reporting; and (b) a report by the registrant's
independent accountant on the entity's internal control system re
lating to financial reporting.

In making this recommendation, the Board recognizes that this re
quirement may set the stage for another important expectation gap unless
the scope and limitations of internal control systems are understood.
A company with an inadequate system of internal control may have
excellent controls because its people are all honest, intelligent, well trained
and highly motivated. Another company with an excellent system of in
ternal control may be defrauded because its management overrides the
system or because a number of officers or employees conspire skillfully to
deceive the auditor.
Internal control, and internal control over financial reporting, may be
terms that lend themselves to misunderstanding. To many, a satisfactory
system of internal control means that the company is well managed.
W hat investors and creditors want is assurance that they will suffer no
loss on their investment. Thus they may be inclined to believe that if a
company is reported to be "under satisfactory control," there will be no
unpleasant surprises for investors.
Unless independent auditors explain clearly the extent of responsi
bility they are assuming when evaluating management's assertions about
its internal control, there will be a serious gap between public expectations
and audit performance.

Recommendation V-13:
The Auditing Standards Board should establish standards that re
quire clear communication of the limits of the assurances being
provided to third parties when auditors report on the adequacy of
client internal control systems.
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Reporting Illegal Acts
Congressmen John Dingell, Ron Wyden and Edward Markey have rein
troduced in the present Congress the "Financial Fraud Detection and Dis
closure A ct" which would provide a mechanism for the establishment of
auditing procedures designed to detect illegal acts and for reporting such
findings to the SEC if the management of the enterprise and its directors
fail to respond to the report by the auditors of its findings. The Board be
lieves enactment of legislation to expand beyond the requirements of the
present auditing standards the obligations of auditors with respect to the
detection and reporting of illegal acts is desirable. Some commentators
have suggested that the auditing procedures called for by the bill should,
at least initially, be established by the Auditing Standards Board, which
presently has the responsibility for establishing auditing standards in gen
eral. Others have suggested the bill does not provide adequate guidance
since it does not reflect the limitations in the ability of auditors to recog
nize illegal acts when companies are subject to such a plethora of federal,
state and local statutes. And still others believe the legislation should not
be limited to illegal acts which may have a material effect on financial
statements or that reporting should be confined to the SEC. The Board
urges that these criticisms be candidly and fully discussed between those
in Congress sponsoring the legislation and members of the profession,
that a good faith effort be made to resolve them in the light of the public
interest, and that then legislation be enacted to expand the obligation of
auditors to seek out and report illegal acts.

Recommendation V-14:
The accounting profession should support carefully drafted legisla
tion requiring auditors to report to the appropriate authorities, in
cluding the SEC, suspected illegalities discovered by the auditor in
the course of an audit if the client's management or board of direc
tors fails to take necessary action with respect to such suspected il
legalities and the auditor believes that they are or may be
significant to the entity. The profession should seek adequate
guidance as to the types of illegalities that would be encompassed
by this requirement.
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Continuing Professional Education
One of the SEC Practice Section's membership requirements is that each
professional in a member firm must receive a minimum of forty hours of
continuing professional education each year. The requirement does not
define the nature of the instruction that would satisfy this requirement.
As a result, courses totally unrelated to auditing or even accounting can
permit professionals involved in an accounting and auditing practice to
meet the requirement. Seminars on how to manage a practice, how to pre
pare tax returns, how to build a practice and so on now qualify.
Since this requirement was intended to improve audit quality, the
membership requirement should require for professionals involved in an
accounting and auditing practice that a substantial number of those hours
must be spent in courses relating to accounting and auditing.

Recommendation V-15:
The SEC Practice Section's membership requirements relating to
continuing professional education should be revised to require that
a substantial number of the required hours of continuing education
relate to accounting and auditing.
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CONCLUSION
The Board recognizes that at first glance it may appear that some of its rec
ommendations, particularly those pertaining to reporting on internal con
trols and the institution of additional measures to detect fraud, will result
in increased audit costs and greater threats of auditor liability. The Board
believes that, while the costs of reports by auditors on internal controls
may entail an increase in audit expense, such expense is necessitated by
the public interest. The additional protections afforded by such reports
and the implementation of additional measures to detect fraud will pro
vide substantial benefits to shareholders that should, in the long run and
in the aggregate, substantially exceed the out-of-pocket costs associated
with those recommendations.
As for additional exposure of auditors to liability, the Board does not
believe its recommendations will have that result; on the contrary, the im
plementation of its recommendations should reduce the likelihood of
faulty audits and thereby reduce the risk of liability. Further, the recom
mendation that auditors report on a client's internal controls is coupled
with another recommendation that such reports clearly communicate the
limits of the assurances provided by the reports.
The Board has sought to avoid "aspirational" recommendations,
such as that auditors should be more concerned with their professional
ism, their independence, etc. Rather, it has sought to frame proposals that
urge identified groups and entities to take specific actions to implement
the proposals. Such an approach facilitates monitoring and measuring the
activity of the profession and its bodies, as well as others, including Con
gress and the SEC, in effecting the changes urged.
The Board believes that its recommendations, if adopted, will go far
to restore public confidence in the accounting profession and will bring
the work of the profession closer to the public's expectations of the profes
sion. These recommendations should also result in a reduction in the pro
fession's exposure to liability.
The challenge to any profession to improve its performance is a con
stant and continuing one. The profession must be sensitive to changes in
the public's expectations of it and should promptly respond to those ex
pectations the profession can reasonably satisfy. It must be alert to
changes in the environment in which it works — regulatory, legal and
economic — so that it may take measures promptly to l ifeguard its integ
rity and reputation. The accounting profession must be willing to extend
the embrace of its unique attestation function to the new kinds of informa
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tion that management, investors, creditors and others are demanding and
are using.
In its meetings with the present and emerging leaders of the profes
sion, the Board senses a concern for the future of the profession, but more
importantly, also sees a willingness to confront and conquer the chal
lenges, present and future, that face and will face the profession. The
Board, to the extent that its mandate permits, hopes to assist the profes
sion in meeting those challenges, for as they are met responsibly the pub
lic interest to which the Board is committed will be well served.
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OVERSIGHT BOARD
TO CONGRESS

Recommendation I-1:
Financial responsibility among those involved in a financial failure
or in fraudulent financial reporting should be allocated in propor
tion to responsibility for losses suffered. Accordingly, " separate
and proportionate" liability legislation applicable to both federal
and state claim s should be enacted by Congress. The civil liability
provisions of RICO should be amended to eliminate treble dam
ages in cases that arise under the federal securities laws.

Recommendation I-2:
Congress should adopt preemptive legislation to perm it the prac
tice of accountancy in a form that appropriately lim its the liability
of individual members of the firm .

TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

Recommendation II-1:
The SEC should amend its rules to require SEC registrants to dis
close whether their auditors have had a peer review, the date of the
m ost recent peer review and its results.

Recommendation V-10:
The SEC should require registrants to include in a document con
taining the annual financial statements a statem ent by the audit
committee (or by the board if there is no audit committee) that de
scribes its responsibilities and tells how they were discharged.
This disclosure should state whether the audit committee members
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(or, in the absence of an audit com mittee, the members of the
board): (a) have reviewed the annual financial statem ents; (b) have
conferred w ith management and the independent auditor about
them ; (c) have received from the independent auditor all informa
tion that the auditor is required to communicate under auditing
standards; (d) believe that the financial statem ents are complete
and consistent w ith information known to them ; and (e) believe
that the financial statements reflect appropriate accounting princi
ples.

Recommendation V-12:
The SEC should require registrants to include in a document con
taining the annual financial statem ents: (a) a report by manage
m ent on the effectiveness of the entity's internal control system
relating to financial reporting; and (b) a report by the registrant's
independent accountant on the entity's internal control system re
lating to financial reporting.

TO THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION OF THE
DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS

Recommendation III-1:
The SEC Practice Section's membership requirements should be
changed to require member firm s to modify their quality control
systems to specify that they take the follow ing steps in response to
allegations of deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of financial
statem ents of an SEC client (or another client encompassed by the
QCIC process) that are made in litigation against the member firm
or its personnel, or in any public proceeding or investigation by a
regulatory agency:
(1) Perform a complete internal analysis of the audit; review all
relevant work papers, correspondence and other files; interview
members of the engagement team.
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(2) Assess the capabilities of the senior audit personnel and de
termine whether the firm should monitor, reassign or terminate
such personnel.
(3) Identify any problems with the firm's quality control system
or training activities.
(4) Identify any implications of the allegations relating to the
adequacy of auditing, quality control or accounting standards.
(5) Identify any implications of the allegations relating to the
adequacy of guidance with respect to the manner in which audits
are conducted, including the evaluation of risks in audits, and re
lating to variations in practice and the interpretations of stand
ards that should be resolved.
(6) Communicate the implications identified in items (4) and (5)
in a structured manner to the QCIC.

Recommendation III-2:
The peer review performance standards should be amended to re
quire peer reviewers to test firms' compliance with these modifica
tions to their quality control systems.

Recommendation III-3:
The QCIC procedures should be modified to require the QCIC to
develop additional procedures to permit it, on the basis of its analy
sis of the QCIC cases and the information reported to it under the
expanded membership requirements discussed above, to facilitate
the resolution of unresolved audit practice issues and to formulate,
either by itself or in collaboration with other appropriate bodies,
practice and guidance directions to the accounting profession in a
retrievable format such as EITF Abstracts, which present issues
considered by the FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force.

Recommendation V-7:
Peer reviewers should evaluate the consultation process by which
specific accounting conclusions are reached, as they do now, and
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should also inquire whether that process leads to accounting that is
appropriate in the circumstances. In testing compliance with the
consultation policies and procedures in a firm, the peer review
team should evaluate the quality of the conclusions reached.

Recommendation V-15:
The SEC Practice Section's membership requirements relating to
continuing professional education should be revised to require that
a substantial number of the required hours of continuing education
relate to accounting and auditing.

TO THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD

Recommendation IV-1:
The FASB should add to its agenda a project to design a brief state
ment explaining the limitations of financial statements. The expla
nation should be made a part of every set of financial statements
described as being "in accordance with generally accepted account
ing principles."

Recommendation IV-2:
The FASB should add to its agenda a project to study comprehen
sively the possibility of requiring the reporting of values and
changes in values rather than historical transaction prices, either as
a basis to propose changes to financial accounting standards or to
explain publicly why such a change in accounting standards is im
practical or otherwise inappropriate. In carrying out this effort,
the FASB should consider and take into account the conclusions of
the AICPA, the Financial Executives Institute and the Association
for Investment Management and Research studies with respect to
the future of financial reporting.
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TO THE AICPA’S ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Recommendation IV-3:
The AICPA's Accounting Standards Executive Committee should
promptly adopt a Statement of Position providing guidance on, and
requiring disclosure of information about, the nature of risks and
uncertainties associated with the reporting entity's operations and
financial condition.

TO THE AUDITING STANDARDS BOARD

Recommendation IV-4:
The Auditing Standards Board should revise the auditor's standard
report to make the prospective nature of certain accounting esti
mates clear, including a caveat that the estimated results may not be
achieved. This communication should not be written as a defen
sive retrenchment by the auditing profession, but rather as a more
realistic and reasonable explanation of the limitation of assurance
that can be provided on certain accounting estimates.

Recommendation V-6:
The following recommendation of the Macdonald Commission
should be adopted by the Auditing Standards Board in the United
States:
When new accounting policies are adopted in response to new
types of transactions or new kinds of assets or obligations, the
auditor should be satisfied that the accounting policies adopted
properly reflect the economic substance of the transaction, asset,
or liability in accordance with the broad theory governing pre
sent-day financial reporting and the established concept of con
servatism in the face of uncertainty.
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Recommendation V-13:
The Auditing Standards Board should establish standards that re
quire clear communication of the limits of the assurances being
provided to third parties when auditors report on the adequacy of
client internal control systems.

TO THE AICPA AND ACCOUNTING FIRMS

Recommendation V-1:
Accounting firms should assure that auditors more consistently im
plement, and be more sensitive to the need to exercise the profes
sional skepticism required by, the auditing standard that provides
guidance on the auditor's responsibility to detect and report errors
and irregularities.

Recommendation V-2:
The Auditing Standards Board, the Executive Committee of the
SEC Practice Section or some other appropriate body should de
velop guidelines to assist auditors in assessing the likelihood that
management fraud which may affect financial information may be
occurring and to specify additional auditing procedures when there
is a heightened likelihood of management fraud.

Recommendation V-3:
The AICPA should undertake a project to sharpen further the dis
tinction between client advocacy and client service and incorporate
that distinction into the profession's Code of Professional Conduct.
Individual accounting firms should constantly review their pro
grams regarding client advocacy and client service to strengthen the
desire of each audit partner to protect the firm's independence.

64

RECOMMENDATIONS O F TH E PU BLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD

Recommendation V-14:
The accounting profession should support carefully drafted legisla
tion requiring auditors to report to the appropriate authorities, in
cluding the SEC, suspected illegalities discovered by the auditor in
the course of an audit if the client's management or board of direc
tors fails to take necessary action with respect to such suspected il
legalities and the auditor believes that they are or may be
significant to the entity. The profession should seek adequate
guidance as to the types of illegalities that would be encompassed
by this requirement.

TO ACCOUNTING FIRMS

Recommendation V-4:
Accounting firms should take special care to ensure that their par
ticipation in the standard setting process is characterized by objec
tivity and professionalism. Standard setters and leaders of the
profession should discuss and address the issues related to client
advocacy in the standard setting process and establish ways of
identifying and correcting aberrant behavior when it occurs.

Recommendation V-5:
Firms' consultation policies and procedures should ensure that cli
ent accounting issues are not discussed with SEC staff without the
benefit of consultation at the appropriate level within the firm.

Recommendation V-8:
The concurring partner, whose participation in an audit is a mem
bership requirement of the SEC Practice Section, should be respon
sible for assuring that those consulted on accounting matters are
aware of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, including an
understanding of the financial statements in whose context the ac
counting policy is being considered. The concurring and consult
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ing partners should know enough about the client to ensure that all
of the relevant facts and circumstances are marshalled, and also
possess the increased detachment that comes from not having to
face the client on an ongoing basis. The concurring partner should
have the responsibility to conclude whether the accounting treat
ment applied is consistent with the objectives of Recommendation
V-6.

TO AUDIT COMMITTEES

Recommendation V-9:
Audit committees (or the board if there is no audit committee)
should assume the following responsibilities relating to an SEC
registrant's preparation of annual financial statements: (a) review
the annual financial statements; (b) confer with management and
the independent auditor about them; (c) receive from the inde
pendent auditor all information that the auditor is required to com
municate under auditing standards; (d) assess whether the financial
statements are complete and consistent with information known to
them; and (e) assess whether the financial statements reflect appro
priate accounting principles.

Recommendation V-11:
The audit committee or the board of directors should be satisfied
that the audit fee negotiated by it or management for the entity's
audit is sufficient to assure the entity will receive a comprehensive
and complete audit.
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Appendix a
B io g ra p h ie s o f B o a rd M e m b e rs
A.A . Som m er, J r ., C hairm an
A.A. Sommer, Jr., Chairman, joined the Board in 1983 and was elected
Chairman in 1986. Mr. Sommer served as Commissioner of the SEC from
1973 to 1976 and is currently a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of
the law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, specializing in securities law.
He is a member of a host of legal and civic organizations and has actively
served such organizations in various capacities, such as advisor, trustee,
committee chairman and member. He is currently on the Board of Gover
nors of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. and was for
merly a member of the boards of the American Bar Association and the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and a member of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board Advisory Council. He is a member
of several boards of directors of public companies and is a frequent lec
turer and author on corporate, securities, and accounting subjects.

Robert K. Mautz, V ice-Chairm an
Robert K. Mautz, Vice-Chairman, joined the Board in 1981. Mr. Mautz is
Professor Emeritus of the University of Illinois and the University of
Michigan. He is a member of the Accounting Hall of Fame, past President
of the American Accounting Association, and former editor of the Ac
counting Review and Accounting Horizons. He has been awarded the
Gold Medal, the AICPA's highest honor, and the American Accounting
Association's Outstanding Educator Award. He is a renown author of
textbooks and technical articles. His service contributions include mem
ber of the AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure, AICPA Council and
Board of Directors, Commission to Study the Common Body of Knowl
edge for CPAs, Cost Accounting Standards Board, Financial Accounting
Standards Advisory Council and Chairman of the Governmental Ac
counting Standards Board Organization Committee.

R obert F. Froehlke
Robert F. Froehlke joined the Board in 1987. Mr. Froehlke served as As
sistant Secretary of Defense for Administration from 1969 to 1971, and
was appointed Secretary of the Army in 1971. He is currently a Director
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of the Institute for Defense Analyses, in addition to being a director of sev
eral other corporate and civic organizations. He is past president of the
American Council of Life Insurance, past Chairman of the Board of Direc
tors of Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S. and currently is Presi
dent and CEO of IDS Mutual Fund Group.

Melvin R. Laird
M elvin R. Laird became a member of the Board in August 1984. Mr.
Laird served as Representative in the U.S. Congress from Wisconsin for
nine terms, as Secretary of Defense from 1969 to 1973, and as Counsellor
to the President for Domestic Affairs from 1973 through 1974. He is a
member of several corporate boards of directors and over sixty boards of
directors of civic organizations. He has received many honors, including
the U.S. Medal of Freedom, the Order of Merit (Federal Republic of Ger
many), the Legion of Honor (France), Man of the Year Awards by the
American Cancer Society and National Association of Mental Health, the
Military Order of the Purple Heart, and the Lasker Award for Medical Re
search. He currently serves as Senior Counsellor for National and Interna
tional Affairs for the Reader's Digest Association and is Chairman of the
Board of the Communications Satellite Corporation.

Paul W . M cCracken
Paul W . M cCracken joined the Board in 1985. Mr. McCracken served as a
member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers from 1956 to
1959 and as its Chairman from 1969 to 1971. He also served President
Reagan as a member of the Economic Policy Advisory Board. Since 1948,
he has been a member of the faculty of the School of Business Administra
tion at the University of Michigan, and in 1966 was appointed the Ed
mund Ezra Day Distinguished University Professor. He has served as a
director on several corporate boards, authored many papers and mono
graphs on economic and financial policy, and frequently lectured and par
ticipated in national and international economic commissions, task forces
and conferences.
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A PPEN D IX B
T h e a c c o u n t in g p r o f e s s i o n ’s
SELF-REG ULA TO R Y PROGRAMS

T

he SEC Practice Section ("SECPS" or the "Section") was founded in
1977 as part of the Division for CPA Firms of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") and is overseen by the
Public Oversight Board (the "Board" or the "PO B").

The Section imposes membership requirements and administers two
fundamental programs to ensure that SEC clients are audited by account
ing firms with adequate quality control systems: (1) peer review, through
which Section members have their practices reviewed every three years by
other accountants, and (2) quality control inquiry, which reviews allega
tions of audit failure contained in litigation filed against member firms re
lating to SEC clients and certain other entities to determine if the firms'
quality control systems require corrective measures.
Currently, the requirements of the SECPS affect more than 105,000
professionals at 1,214 member firms, which audit more than 14,750 SEC
clients.

The P eer Review P rocess
Each member firm is required to subject its quality control system to re
view by independent peers at least once every three years. A peer review
evaluates: (1) whether a firm's system of quality control for its accounting
and auditing practice is appropriately comprehensive and suitably de
signed for its needs; (2) whether its quality control policies and proce
dures are adequately communicated to professional personnel; (3)
whether such policies and procedures are being complied with; and (4)
whether the firm is complying with the membership requirements of the
SECPS.

G eneral C onsiderations in a P eer Review
Administration of the Peer Review Program is the responsibility of the
Section's Peer Review Committee. The committee establishes the stand
ards for performing and reporting on peer reviews, enforces compliance
by review teams with its standards, evaluates the reports on individual
peer reviews and the suitability of action plans to correct quality control
deficiencies submitted by reviewed firms prior to inclusion in a publicly
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accessible file, and follows up as necessary to assure that appropriate cor
rective action is taken by firms.

The Review Team
A review team may be appointed by the Peer Review Committee, may be
formed by a member firm engaged by the firm under review or may be
formed by an association or state CPA society authorized to administer
peer reviews. Only partners of SECPS member firms currently involved
in the audit function are eligible to serve as review team captains. Mem
bers of the review team must be independent of the reviewed firm. Recip
rocal reviews between firms are not permitted.
Review teams must have knowledge of the type of practice to be re
viewed, including knowledge of the specialized industries of the reviewed
firm's clients. In the case of firms with SEC practices, review team person
nel must possess current knowledge of SEC rules and regulations.

Perform ing th e Review
A peer review has four distinct phases:
1. Study and evaluation of the firm's quality control system;
2. Review for compliance with the firm's quality control policies and
procedures at each organizational or functional level within the
firm, including review of workpaper files and reports for selected
accounting and auditing engagements;
3. Review of the firm's compliance with membership requirements of
the SECPS; and
4. Preparation of a written report and, where applicable, a letter on
matters that require corrective action by the firm.

E xten t o f Review Team ’s Tests
Careful planning is required to determine the extent of tests to be per
formed. In planning the review, the review team obtains an under
standing of: (a) the nature and extent of the reviewed firm's accounting
and auditing practice, including, for example, whether the clients are in
troubled industries or have weak financial reporting systems, which are
factors increasing the likelihood that the financial statements of such cli
ents may not be presented in accordance with generally accepted account
ing principles; and (b) the design of the firm's quality control policies and
procedures, including, for example, whether the firm's personnel are ex
pected to use, and are trained to use, industry specific practice aids to re
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duce the possibility that materially deficient financial statements could go
undetected after application of the firm's quality controls.
After assessing those risks and considering the findings of the firm's
current year's inspection (the review that the firm performs of its own
practice), the review team determines the offices and engagements to be
reviewed to reasonably assure that the review would detect the presence
of deficiencies in the firm's quality controls, which, should they exist,
would expose the firm to a serious possibility that its engagements might
not be conducted in accordance with professional standards. The offices
and engagements to be reviewed are a reasonable cross-section of the
firm's practice with greater emphasis on those offices and engagements
with the highest levels of risk.
The effectiveness of the firm's inspection program may affect the se
lection process of the review team. For example, fewer offices and en
gagements may have to be reviewed by the review team if tests of the
firm's inspection indicate that the review team may appropriately com
bine peer review and inspection findings in evaluating the design of a
firm's quality control system and compliance therewith.
The objectives of the review of engagements are to obtain evidence
that: (1) the reviewed firm's system of quality control met the objectives
of quality control standards to the extent applicable to the firm's practice;
(2) there was compliance by personnel of the firm with the firm's quality
control policies and procedures in the performance of accounting and
auditing services; and (3) there was compliance with the Section's mem
bership requirements. For each engagement reviewed, the review team
documents its conclusions as to whether anything came to its attention to
cause it to believe that: (a) the financial statements were not presented in
all material respects in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles; (b) the firm did not have a basis under professional standards
for the report issued; (c) the documentation did not support the report is
sued; or (d) the firm did not comply with its quality control policies and
procedures in all material respects.
While the thrust of a peer review is to identify deficiencies in a firm's
system of quality control, the process also identifies engagements deemed
not to have been performed in accordance with professional standards.
These are reported to the Peer Review Committee, which follows up to as
certain that appropriate action is taken, for example, reports are recalled
and financial statements restated or the omitted audit procedures are per
formed to ascertain whether the financial statements should be restated.
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R eporting o n P eer Reviews
Peer Review Report
The review team 's report includes a statement of the scope of the review, a
description of the general characteristics of a system of quality control,
and the team 's opinion — or a disclaimer of opinion — as to whether the
reviewed firm's quality control system is adequate and was being com
plied with to provide the firm with reasonable assurance of conforming
with professional standards and the membership requirements of the Sec
tion.
The review team's report may be either unqualified or modified. An
unqualified report is issued when the review team is satisfied with the
firm's quality control system and its compliance with that system and the
membership requirements of the Section and a modified report is issued
when the review team is not satisfied. A modified report may express a
qualified opinion or an adverse opinion, or it may include a disclaimer of
opinion. A qualified opinion identifies significant deficiencies in the sys
tem or in compliance with the system. An adverse opinion indicates that
the system is not adequate, that compliance is not adequate, or both. A
disclaimer of opinion is issued when limitations placed on the scope of the
peer review are so significant that the review team cannot form an overall
opinion.

Letter of Comments
While a letter of comments always accompanies a modified report, a letter
is also issued with unqualified reports when the review team discovers
conditions that create more than a remote possibility of nonconformity
with professional standards or discovers noncompliance with quality con
trol policies and procedures or membership requirements at a level that
requires corrective action. Letters of comment have accompanied un
qualified reports for approximately 80% of the reviews conducted.
The reviewed firm is required to respond in writing to each item in
the letter of comments. Its response describes actions taken or planned
with respect to each deficiency or recommended improvement noted.
The Peer Review Committee carefully considers the deficiencies dis
cussed in a letter of comments and the firm's response thereto as part of
its evaluation of the appropriateness of an unqualified report or its deci
sion whether a qualified opinion or an adverse opinion is appropriate
when a firm is found to have significant deficiencies in its system or in its
compliance with the system. These evaluations and discussions require
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mature and thoughtful judgment because there are no quantitative criteria
that can be used to measure the significance of perceived deficiencies.

P eer Review Com m ittee Supervision
The committee's role in the peer review process is an active one. No re
port is official until the committee accepts it. Every report, letter of com
ments and accompanying response receive the attention of the committee.
If there is an apparent inconsistency between a review team 's findings in
the peer review workpapers and its report or letter of comments, the com
mittee pursues the matter until resolved.
In certain circumstances, the committee accepts a report only upon
agreement by the firm in writing to stipulated conditions, such as a revisit
by the review team captain to review the actions taken to eliminate defi
ciencies uncovered in the review. In this manner, the committee assures
that recommended improvements in quality are carried out.

Public A ccess to P eer Review R eports
Upon acceptance by the committee, the review team's report and letter of
comments, together with the reviewed firm's response, are maintained in
files available to the public at the AICPA offices in New York City. When
a report is accepted only based upon a firm's agreement to a stipulated
condition, relevant correspondence to that effect is also placed in the pub
lic file.

POB and SEC O versight
The staff of the Public Oversight Board (the "Board" or the "PO B") di
rectly oversees each peer review by evaluating the review team 's qualifi
cations, by reading the report, letter of comments and the firm's response,
by reviewing selected workpapers and by participating in the meetings at
which the committee processes the peer reviews. The staff also conducts
direct oversight of many peer reviews of firms with SEC clients and re
views all the peer review workpapers of firms with SEC clients that it does
not visit. As a result of recommendations of the POB's staff, changes are
often made in the composition of review teams, scope, report or letter of
comments, and in the corrective measures firms are required to take. In
addition, the Board and its staff review and comment on or propose
changes in peer review standards and the operating procedures of the
committee and its staff. The Board's oversight of the process has led it to
conclude that the peer review process is effective in fostering audit quality
among SECPS member firms.
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The SEC performs is own independent evaluation of the peer review
process and Board oversight. The staff of the Chief Accountant inspects a
sample of peer review workpapers and the corresponding Board over
sight workpapers. As a result, the SEC has said that " the peer review
process contributes significantly to improving the quality control systems
of member firms and, therefore, should enhance the consistency and qual
ity of practice before the Commission."

The Quality C ontrol Inquiry Com m ittee P rocess
Mission of the Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC)
The Executive Committee of the SECPS established the QCIC in recogni
tion of the significant public interest that exists in determining promptly
whether an allegation of audit failure against a firm indicates any of the
following defects that should be promptly corrected: (1) a weakness in the
firm's quality control system or in compliance with that system; or (2) the
need for changes in generally accepted auditing standards, accounting
principles, or quality control standards.
The courts and other judicial, regulatory, and governmental bodies
have the means to determine whether allegations of audit failure are cor
rect, and if so, to punish firms and individuals, when appropriate under
the law. The prompt inquiry that the QCIC makes concerning reported al
leged failures provides a means to identify and correct defects in quality
control, a task which the courts and other bodies are ill-equipped to, and
do not, perform.

Requirement to Report to the QCIC
Member firms are required to report to the QCIC within 30 days of service
any litigation (including criminal indictments) against the firm or its per
sonnel or any investigation publicly announced by a regulatory agency
that alleges deficiencies in the conduct of an audit of the financial state
ments or reporting thereon of a present or former SEC client or a bank or
other lending institution client for which another regulator has been
vested with the powers, functions and duties of the SEC.
In addition, if the committee identifies a significant public interest in
an alleged audit failure not required to be reported, the Executive Com
mittee of the Section may require the firm to report the matter. In this re
gard, the QCIC screens all allegations of audit failure made by federal or
state governmental agencies concerning the audits of financial institutions
that are not SEC clients and requests firms to voluntarily report such mat
ters that appear to warrant further consideration.
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Four-Phased A pproach
A task force, usually consisting of one or two committee members and
AICPA staff persons, is assigned to each case. The task force proceeds in
accordance with procedures specified in the document entitled, Frame
work for the Evaluation Process of the SECPS Quality Control Inquiry
Committee, which specifies that the QCIC conduct its procedures in four
distinct phases:
■

Analysis of Allegations;

■

General Inquiries Concerning a Firm's Quality Control Policies
and Procedures and Compliance Therewith;

■

In-Depth Inquiries Concerning a Firm's Quality Control Policies
and Procedures and Compliance Therewith; and

■

Special Review.

The assigned task force continues from one phase to the next in the
process until satisfied that there is nothing to be gained by continuing fur
ther. That is, the evidence available is sufficient to persuade the task force
that nothing significant is to be accomplished in the way of public protec
tion by continuing the inquiry.

Analysis
This phase consists of reading the complaint(s), relevant financial state
ments and other publicly available materials related to the complaint, and
informal telephone inquiry with the firm.

General Inquiries
This phase consists of a discussion of the issues raised in the litigation that
may have quality control implications with representatives of the firm
and, if deemed appropriate, its peer reviewers. This phase may include
reading peer review workpapers or internal inspection reports.

In-Depth Inquiries
This phase consists of a discussion of relevant quality control policies,
procedures and compliance with firm personnel who have become famil
iar with the specific engagement; reviewing firm technical manuals and
guidance materials; and reading certain audit documentation.
It also may include timely inspection of other work performed by
certain personnel. Under this procedure, which was adopted in 1991, the
QCIC may require firms to perform a timely inspection of other work per
formed by individuals who supervised an audit that resulted in allega
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tions of audit failure to enable the committee to better assure that these in
dividuals are complying with the firm's quality control system.

Special Review
This phase consists of reviewing relevant aspects of quality control poli
cies and procedures and compliance therewith, following procedures
similar to those applied in a peer review. There are five types:
■

A review of other engagements supervised by personnel who su
pervised the allegedly faulty audit;

■

A review of selected engagements in the same industry;

■

A review of an office or offices;

■

A review of selected engagements with unique transactions or
conditions; and

■

A review of the entire system—in effect, an accelerated peer re
view.

The type of review performed, its scope and the reviewers selected
are determined on a case-by-case basis.

Closed Case Summary
The QCIC closes its files on a case when it concludes that there is no need
for action by the firm beyond whatever measures may have already been
taken. After the committee closes a case, it prepares a "closed case sum
m ary" describing its consideration of the matter, the issues addressed, the
procedures followed and the basis for the QCIC's conclusions. This sum
mary is retained until the staff of the Chief Accountant of the SEC has re
viewed it.

POB and SEC O versight
The POB and its staff monitor the activities of the QCIC and have unre
stricted access to the committee's files as well as to all meetings of the
committee and its task forces. The Board's staff reads the complaint, perti
nent financial statements, other public documents and relevant profes
sional literature for each reported case. The POB is represented at every
committee meeting and its staff participates, at its discretion, in most of
the task force meetings with representatives of firms reporting litigation.
The SEC also oversees the QCIC process and the POB oversight of it.
For each closed case, the SEC reads the closed case summary and the
POB's oversight work program and the SEC staff meets with the POB and
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QCIC staff to obtain further information, if necessary, about the basis for
the committee's conclusions concerning any case.

Sanctions Against M em ber Firm s
The Executive Committee of the SECPS has the authority to impose sanc
tions on member firms, ordinarily based on recommendations of the Peer
Review Committee or the QCIC. The decision to impose a sanction is
based on the vote of a hearing panel and, if necessary, the vote of an ap
peals panel in accordance with rules of procedure for such proceedings.
Experience to date has shown that the formal imposition of a sanction has
rarely been necessary, because the objectives of the Section have been
achieved through the voluntary cooperation of member firms in undertak
ing remedial or corrective action when deficiencies are found.
Formal sanctions may be imposed when a member firm:
■

Refuses to abide by the membership requirements;

■

Refuses to cooperate with the Peer Review Committee or take
corrective action recommended as a result of a peer review;

■

Refuses to cooperate with the QCIC or take corrective action rec
ommended by that committee; or

■

Commits an egregious act for which corrective action is an inade
quate response.

To date the only type of formal sanction that has been imposed has
been expulsion; however, the following additional types of sanctions may
be imposed for failure to comply with the requirements of membership:
■

Corrective measures by the firm including consideration by the
firm of appropriate actions with respect to individual firm per
sonnel;

■

Additional requirements for continuing professional education;

■

Accelerated or special peer reviews;

■

Admonishment, censure or reprimand;

■

Monetary fines; or

■

Suspension from membership.

Following the imposition of a sanction, a copy of the documents set
ting forth the sanction is placed in the member firm's public file and the
name of the member firm and the decision rendered is published in an
AICPA membership periodical.
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SECPS M em bership Requirem ents
To maximize the participation in the SECPS by firms auditing publicly
held companies, an AICPA bylaw provides that a certified public account
ant engaged in the practice of public accounting with a firm auditing one
or more SEC clients may retain membership in the AICPA only if the firm
in which he or she practices is a member of the SEC Practice Section.
An accounting firm that is a member of the Section must meet mem
bership requirements. Compliance with them is tested in the peer review
process. A member firm must:
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■

Adhere to quality control standards established by the AICPA;

■

Have a peer review every three years, the results of which are
available to the public;

■

Require all professionals in the firm — not just CPAs — to take
part in 120 hours of continuing professional education every
three years;

■

Periodically rotate the partner in charge of each SEC audit en
gagement;

■

Conduct a concurring, or second partner, preissuance review on
each SEC audit engagement;

■

Report annually to the audit committee or board of directors of
each SEC audit client on the fees received from the client for
management advisory services during the year under audit and
on the types of services rendered;

■

Report to the QCIC any litigation against the firm or its person
nel that alleges deficiencies in an audit of an SEC client or regu
lated financial institution;

■

Report directly to the SEC the termination of any client-auditor
relationship with an SEC client within five business days; and

■

Report annually, for the Section's public files, the number of firm
personnel, the number of SEC clients, data about MAS fees and
other information.

A PPEN D IX C
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION O F SECURITIES
DEALERS, INC.
I. structure
The National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the "NASD") is a na
tional securities association registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the "SEC") pursuant to the provisions of the Securities Ex
change Act of 1934 (the "Exchange A ct"). As such, it has been given the
responsibility to secure compliance by its members with the rules of the
NASD and the specific requirements of the federal securities laws, as well
as to promote fair trade and high ethical standards for commercial con
duct among its members. The NASD's main role is self-regulation of its
membership through a continuous program of rulemaking, interpretation,
and surveillance and enforcement of its rules, trade practices and ethical
standards through its disciplinary process.

A. Membership
While membership in the NASD is voluntary, for practical purposes,
with very narrow exceptions, it is impossible to conduct a securities
business and deal with the public without being a member of the
NASD. Membership is generally open to any broker or dealer
authorized to transact an investment banking or securities business
in the United States. The membership of the NASD is nationwide
and includes virtually all broker-dealers.
For administrative purposes, the NASD membership is divided into
eleven geographical districts. Members in all districts are subject to
various fees and assessments, including an assessment on gross in
come. These fees are a principal source of the NASD's funding.

B. Board of Governors
The management and administration of the NASD are under the di
rection of the board of governors (the "Board"). The Board's duties
include: (1) the determination of national policy; (2) the promulga
tion of rules and interpretations of those rules; (3) the supervision of
the performance of its own committees and the executive staff in the
administration and enforcement of Board policies and the NASD
rules; and (4) the appellate review of the NASD disciplinary actions.
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The Board is comprised of twenty-nine members, consisting of fif
teen members elected from the securities industry, thirteen at large
members representing issuers, members, underwriters, and insur
ance companies, and the President of the NASD. Board members are
elected for three-year terms. With the exception of the President,
who serves as the spokesman for the NASD, all members of the
Board serve without compensation. They are, however, reimbursed
for reasonable expenses associated with meetings.

C. National Business Conduct Committee
The Board has the authority to appoint committees to assist it in con
nection with the management of the business and affairs of the
NASD. One such important committee is the National Business Con
duct Committee (the "'NBCC"). The principal objective of the NBCC
is to ensure that disciplinary actions taken by the NASD's District
Business Conduct Committees (the "DBCC"), discussed below, are
consistent with NASD policy, and that sanctions imposed are consis
tent with those imposed in similar cases.
The members of the NBCC are chosen annually by the Board from
the pool of sitting Board members; they are usually first year mem
bers of the Board. Currently, there are eight members of the NBCC.

D. District Committees
The district committees in each of eleven geographic districts admin
ister the NASD's affairs at the local level. Each district committee
consists of a number of members who are active participants in the
securities or investment banking business and are elected for threeyear terms.
The district committees sit as the DBCCs responsible for the NASD's
enforcement programs in the respective districts. The DBCCs' duties
include: (1) the review of all examination reports submitted by the
NASD examiners in its district; (2) the investigation of all complaints
against members and persons associated with members; (3) the con
duct of disciplinary proceedings; and (4) the issuance of decisions
and imposition of sanctions in response to complaints filed by or
with the DBCC's.
Typically, the full district committee serves as the DBCC. The only
distinction between the district committees and the DBCCs is that the
title, "D istrict Business Conduct Committee," is used in all discipli
nary proceedings.
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E. NASD staff
The NASD maintains a staff at offices in each of the eleven geo
graphic districts and has an executive office in Washington, D.C.
Each district functions as a regional office and is staffed by a district
director, mid-level supervisors, and a complement of examiners.
The NASD district staff functions are to obtain the necessary infor
mation for the DBCC to enable it to determine whether, in a given
case, a disciplinary proceeding should be instituted; to administer
the NASD's examination and inspection programs; and, once appar
ent violations have been detected, to act in a prosecutory capacity in
connection with the ensuing disciplinary proceeding.

II. Operations
A. Disciplinary Process
1. NASD Staff Investigations
In connection with its efforts to detect possible violations of its
rules and the applicable provisions of the federal securities
laws, the NASD maintains a comprehensive surveillance pro
gram. The program includes two general categories of exami
nations: (1) routine; and (2) special.
Of the approximately 10,000 examinations conducted by the
NASD in 1991, 2,600 were routine examinations. All members
of the NASD are subject to a routine examination at least once
every three years. Members who maintain custody of client
funds are subject to such an examination annually.
A routine examination typically includes a financial/opera
tional review and a review of sales practices. The finan
cial/operational portion of the examination consists of an
inspection of: (1) the member firm's books and records; (2) con
trols relating to supervision within the member's organization;
and (3) various other areas of the member's business. A rou
tine examination is not as extensive as the typical financial
statement audit, and may have a duration anywhere from a
day to a week depending upon the size of the firm being exam
ined.
The sales practices portion of the routine examination varies
depending on the types and volume of products sold by the
member. The inspection generally focuses on the handling of
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customer accounts, including the suitability of investments,
and whether customers are provided with adequate and timely
information concerning their investments.
In addition to routine examinations, the NASD staff conducted
approximately 7,400 special examinations in 1991. Special ex
aminations generally originate from two sources: (1) customer
complaints; and (2) reported terminations of registered repre
sentatives "for cause" by their member employers. In each
case the scope of the special examination is limited to obtaining
specific information about the apparent violations alleged in
the complaint, or the facts surrounding the dismissal of the
registered representative. In 1991, approximately 3,700 special
examinations were conducted in response to each of these two
categories.
The NASD staff's role in both types of examinations is to
gather all relevant information for review by the DBCC. The
staff, however, has no subpoena power and may not compel
third parties to provide information or documents. Moreover,
the cost of the examination is borne by the NASD.
Upon completion of the examination, the staff prepares a writ
ten report setting out the results of its inquiry and presents it to
the DBCC. In the case of routine examinations, the NASD has
a uniform form of report which is prepared for each product
offered by the examinee. These reports are the basis for the
DBCC determination as to whether a disciplinary action
should be initiated.

2. The Disciplinary Hearing
a. Complaint and Answer
If the DBCC concludes that the member has violated the
NASD rules or the federal securities laws, the DBCC may file
a complaint against the member or associated person. Com
plaints may also originate from the Board or the general pub
lic. In 1991, approximately 1,000 formal and informal
disciplinary actions were filed against NASD members or
persons associated with them.
Common allegations contained in the DBCC complaints in
clude sales practice violations such as churning or sharing in
customer profits/losses, fraudulent or improper trade re-
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porting/practices, as well as other practices such as misap
propriation or misuse of customer funds or securities.
The respondent must file with the DBCC a written answer to
the charges in the complaint within twenty days from the
date of receipt of the notice unless the time is extended by the
DBCC. The answer is required to be on the NASD form, a
copy of which accompanies the complaint when delivered to
the respondent.
In order to assure the opportunity to present a defense in a
hearing, the respondent must request a hearing before the
DBCC at the same time the answer is submitted. If the re
spondent fails to do so, the right to a hearing may be deemed
to be waived. In addition, if the respondent fails to answer
the complaint within ten days after receiving a second notice,
the DBCC may consider the allegations of the complaint as
admitted by the respondent and impose the appropriate pen
alties.

b. Jurisdiction and Venue
The DBCC has original jurisdiction in handling all com
plaints. Normally complaints are heard by the DBCC of the
district in which the principal office of the NASD member is
located. In cases in which the claim arose entirely or largely
from the acts or omissions of a branch office of a brokerdealer, however, the case is heard by the DBCC of the district
in which the branch office is located.

c. Pretrial Discovery
As noted above the NASD has no subpoena power. The
DBCC may, however, prior or subsequent to a filing of a
complaint, require a member to submit a report on the activi
ties in question and to open its books, records, and accounts
for inspection. The refusal of a member to supply such infor
mation during the course of an investigation of a complaint
may result in a violation of the NASD rules.
In addition, if the complaint concerns a customer of the re
spondent or a financial institution, the NASD will frequently
request the submission of information by such person,
whether or not such party is a member of the NASD. Obvi
ously, for non-members, responding to the request is purely
voluntary. The NASD staff, however, has found that such re-
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quests are frequently successful so long as the respondent
has not previously settled its dispute with the third party.
The NASD rules do not provide for any prehearing discov
ery by the respondent. They do, however, require the staff of
the NASD, upon request, to make available to the respondent
a list of the witnesses, schedules, documents, and other ex
hibits in the NASD's possession which it intends to use at the
hearing to support the allegations in the complaint. More
over, the respondent has the right to formally request the
NASD staff to utilize its inspection power to obtain addi
tional information which the respondent believes is needed
to present its defense.
Evidence obtained by the NASD staff in connection with a
hearing, including the NASD staff report, is for reasonable
cause made available by the NASD to other regulatory bod
ies, including the SEC. Private parties occasionally subpoena
the NASD or its staff in an attempt to obtain the NASD staff
report or other information for the purposes of private litiga
tion. The NASD's policy has been to review each subpoena
on a case-by-case basis. When in the opinion of the NASD
the equities favor nondisclosure, the NASD will attempt to
defeat the subpoena as a matter of principle.

d. The Healing
After the response to the complaint is filed and a hearing is
requested, and assuming a settlement is not negotiated, a
hearing before the DBCC is scheduled. A typical DBCC
hearing has seven stages: (1) the hearing begins with an
opening statement by the designated chairman of the panel
setting forth the ground rules for the hearing; (2) the NASD
staff or complainant presents an opening argument; (3) the
respondent presents an opening argument; (4) the NASD
staff or complainant presents its case-in-chief, followed by
cross-examination by the respondent; (5) the respondent pre
sents evidence, followed by cross-examination by the NASD
staff or complainant; (6) the NASD staff or complainant pre
sents its closing argument; and (7) the respondent presents
its closing argument.
The complainant or the NASD has the burden of showing a
prima facie violation of the NASD rules by the respondent.
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Accordingly the NASD staff presents its case first. If the staff
is considered to have made a successful showing, the burden
of going forward shifts to the respondent.
NASD hearings are much more informal than a typical court
hearing, with the DBCC having a wide latitude as to all
phases of the conduct of the hearing. The panel members of
the DBCC assigned to hear the case (typically two or more
current or former members of the DBCC) are usually not
lawyers but industry peers of the respondent. The NASD
staff is typically represented by NASD regional counsel, who
take the prosecutorial role in the proceedings and present
evidence against the respondent.
Rules of evidence relevant to court proceedings are generally
not applicable to the DBCC hearing. For example, testimony
in the hearings is not under oath and may be offered tele
phonically; hearsay evidence is considered; documentary
evidence will generally be received into evidence without
complying with the foundational requirements applicable in
court proceedings; and objections to the form of questions
are rarely sustained.
Notwithstanding the lack of courtroom formalities in the
DBCC hearing, the respondent is entitled to certain basic
rights including: (1) the right to be heard in person and be
represented by counsel at a hearing; (2) the right to cross-ex
amine witnesses; and (3) the right to present a defense. In
addition, the respondent may successfully object to the intro
duction of evidence if cumulative or irrelevant.
The length of the DBCC hearings vary depending upon the
complexity of the issues. Approximately eighty percent of
the DBCC hearings involve fairly routine matters and are
completed within four to six hours. The remaining twenty
percent of hearings are more complex in nature, include mul
tiple charges, and may result in a hearing lasting several
days. Hearings extending beyond a week are extremely rare.
Over the last four years there have been a total of approxi
mately five multiple week hearings.

e. The Decision
Any determination reached in connection with a complaint,
whether or not a hearing is held, must be incorporated in a
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written decision and must set forth the specific findings of
the DBCC. In 1991, 1031 decisions were issued, compared
with 1044 in 1990.
All decision findings must include: (1) an enumeration of the
specific rule or rules violated; (2) an explanation of the act or
practice which the respondent has been found to have en
gaged in or omitted; (3) the basis upon which the findings
are made; and (4) the penalties imposed and the reasons
therefore. If the DBCC finds that no violations have oc
curred, a written decision to that effect is usually prepared
by the NASD staff in consultation with the DBCC.

3. Sanctions
The NASD has a broad range of sanctions at its disposal which
may be imposed for each or any violation of the NASD rules or
federal securities laws by a member or a person associated
with a member. These sanctions include: (1) censure; (2) im
position of a fine; (3) suspension from membership or registra
tion; (4) expulsion from membership or revocation of
registration; (5) suspension or bar from association with all
members; and (6) any other sanction deemed appropriate un
der the circumstances.
Censure is typically imposed for any violation of the NASD
rules or federal securities laws. A censure without other addi
tional sanctions is generally imposed for violations not requir
ing the imposition of more severe sanctions or in situations
where extraordinary mitigating factors exist.
Fines of any amount may be imposed upon a member or per
son associated with a member. While the highest fine imposed
against any individual in 1990 was $510,083, in 1991 the NASD
levied a $2,250,000 fine against a single registered repre
sentative and imposed fines in several cases against member
firms and individuals in excess of $1,000,000.
The suspension of a member or a person associated with a
member may result in that member or person being unable to
engage in certain aspects of the securities business for a period
of time specified in the decision. Thus, the suspension may be
limited to only specific activities. At the end of the period of
the suspension, the member or person is reinstated in good
standing, assuming all fines and costs assessed with the deci
sion have been paid.
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The expulsion of a firm from membership in the NASD and
the bar of an individual from future association with a member
are the most severe sanctions in the NASD's arsenal. These
sanctions result in a member firm being excluded from the se
curities business or a person associated with a member being
barred from employment with a member.
In addition to the above sanctions, any member or person asso
ciated with a member who is disciplined by the NASD may be
assessed costs of the proceedings. These costs may include ex
penses involved with preparing transcripts of the proceeding
and other hearing related expenses. Moreover, the NASD fre
quently orders the respondent to pay restitution to any injured
third party.
Monies which the NASD actually obtains through the imposi
tion of sanctions generally amount to an insignificant percent
age of the NASD's total annual funding.

4. Appellate Review
a. Board of Governors
The Board has appellate jurisdiction over all decisions of the
DBCCs. Any party aggrieved by a decision of the DBCC, as
a matter of right, may appeal the decision to the Board. Such
appeal must be made within fifteen days after the date of no
tice of the decision unless the Board grants an extension. In
1991, approximately 200 cases were appealed to the Board.
Practically all complex cases involving multiple claims are
appealed.
In addition, the Board has the authority, on its own motion,
to call for review any decision issued by a DBCC. The Board
must exercise its right of review within forty-five days from
the date of issuance of the DBCC's decision.
The Board has designated the NBCC as the committee to ad
minister the NASD's disciplinary program and to exercise
appellate review authority. Consequently, every decision by
each of the eleven districts of the NASD is reviewed by the
NBCC. The purpose of such review is to determine whether
the decision is consistent with NASD policy and whether the
sanctions imposed, if any, are consistent with the seriousness
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of the violations found and with sanctions imposed in similar
cases.
On appeal the Board, acting through the NBCC, has the
authority to: (1) affirm, dismiss, modify or reverse dismissals
with respect to each of the DBCC findings; (2) increase, re
duce, modify, or cancel any disciplinary action taken by the
DBCC; or (3) remand the case with instructions for further
proceedings. In any event, the institution of an appeal or re
view automatically stays any disciplinary sanction.
The Board's appellate powers are subject to limitations in
that the Board may not consider grounds other than those
fairly derived from the complaint as a basis to impose or af
firm a sanction.
In connection with the review by the NBCC, the parties, if
they participated in the DBCC proceedings, are again given
the opportunity for a hearing and may appear by counsel or
in person. The Board has wide flexibility concerning the con
duct of the appeal hearing. The Board may render its deci
sion based on the record before it and may review, with
some limitations, evidence not previously considered but
which the Board deems relevant to the appeal. In any event,
the Board conducts a de novo review of the matter. Thus, a
respondent has the opportunity at the NBCC level for a full
review of the matter including the right to reargue his case.
Upon rendering its decision, the Board is required to provide
written notification of the results of its decision to the re
spondent. In addition, if the decision of the Board is not ap
pealed to the SEC, notice of the decision is issued to the press
and the membership of the NASD after the Board's decision
becomes effective. If, on the other hand, the Board's decision
is appealed to the SEC, the Board will generally delay notice
of its decision until it receives notice of the appeal from the
SEC, so that the fact of the appeal may also be publicized.

b. Appeal to the SEC
Any person aggrieved by disciplinary action of the NASD
may have such action reviewed by the SEC. Approximately
twenty percent of all DBCC decisions are ultimately ap
pealed to the SEC. In 1991 alone, approximately thirty cases
were appealed to the SEC, and eighteen decisions were is-
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sued. The SEC has generally been reluctant to disturb either
the major findings of violations or imposition of sanctions,
choosing to affirm virtually every decision of the Board.
On appeal the SEC may: (1) affirm; (2) set aside, reduce, or
otherwise modify the findings and sanctions imposed; or (3)
remand the case to the NASD for further proceedings. Nota
bly, the SEC does not have the authority to increase the sanc
tions imposed by the NASD.
An application for review of the NASD disciplinary action by
the SEC is required to be filed by the aggrieved person
within thirty days from the date notice of such action was re
ceived unless a longer period is permitted by the SEC. The
SEC, on its own motion, may also initiate review proceed
ings.
Unless the SEC orders otherwise, the institution of review
proceedings does not operate to stay automatically the disci
plinary sanctions which are the subject of the review. As a
matter of practice, the NASD does not enforce fines or sus
pensions pending SEC review, but does seek to enforce bars
or expulsions from membership. The aggrieved person
must, therefore, apply to the SEC for consideration of a stay
of bars or expulsion orders.
An application to the SEC for review does not grant a right to
a completely new evidentiary hearing. The scope of the
hearing is wholly within the discretion of the SEC. Typically,
the hearing will consist solely of consideration of the record
of the NASD and opportunity for the presentation of sup
porting reasons to affirm, modify, or set aside the sanction,
or to dismiss the proceeding. In certain circumstances, the
SEC may direct that the record under review be supple
mented with additional evidence. In any case, the SEC con
ducts a de novo review of each matter.
In a rriving at its decision the SEC is required by statute to ap
ply a two-tiered standard of review. In connection with the
first tier, the SEC must review the record to determine if the
findings of violations by the NASD are supported by the evi
dence. If the SEC determines that the applicant did not in
fact exhibit such conduct as found or that the conduct did not
violate the designated rule, then the SEC must set aside the
action taken by the NASD or remand the matter to the NASD
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for further proceedings. Conversely, if the SEC finds that the
applicant engaged in the conduct found by the NASD and
that such conduct violated the NASD rules designated or the
federal securities laws, then the SEC proceeds to the second
level of its review process. Under the second tier, if the SEC
finds the sanction imposed by the NASD imposes any bur
den on competition not necessary or appropriate in further
ance of the purposes of the Exchange Act, or is excessive or
oppressive, it may reduce, cancel, or require the remission of
such sanction.
Any final order of the SEC is released to the press and to the
NASD membership by the NASD, upon receipt by the NASD
of the SEC order.

c. Appeal to the Courts
Any person aggrieved following a decision by the SEC may
appeal the decision to the appropriate United States Court of
Appeals. Three such appeals were filed in 1991. Such ap
peals must be filed within sixty days after entry of the SEC's
order.

B. Relationship to the SEC
The Exchange Act provides the SEC with the following powers over
the NASD: (1) to review any disciplinary action imposed by the
NASD; (2) to abrogate any rule of the NASD or require the NASD to
adopt a rule of the SEC; (3) to disapprove any change in the rules
proposed by the NASD; and (4) to suspend or revoke the NASD's
registration if it fails to enforce compliance with its own rules.
The SEC has no regular program for the examination of broker-deal
ers. The SEC, however, monitors the NASD's examination process.
In addition, the SEC has on occasion chosen to conduct its own ex
aminations or conduct joint examinations with the NASD upon dis
covery of widespread or systematic problems in the industry. A
recent example occurred in 1991, when the SEC and the NASD con
ducted, on a cooperative basis, special examinations of the activities
of franchise offices of certain penny-stock broker-dealers.
The SEC also receives copies of every decision rendered by the
NASD and may call up for review any disciplinary action taken by
the NASD. Finally, the SEC reviews annually the NASD's assess
ment schedule to determine whether it is fair and equitable.
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A PPEN D IX D
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SA FETY BOARD
The National Transportation Safety Board (the "NTSB" or the
" Board") is an independent agency that determines the "probable
cause" of transportation accidents and promotes transportation
safety through the issuance of safety recommendations.
The NTSB also conducts safety studies; evaluates the effectiveness of
other government agencies and transportation safety programs; and re
views appeals of adverse actions by the United States Department of
Transportation involving pilot and mariner certificates and licenses.
In an attempt to prevent accidents, the NTSB develops and issues
safety recommendations to other government agencies, industry and
other organizations that it believes are in a position to improve transporta
tion safety. The recommendations are always based on the NTSB's inves
tigations and studies.
The NTSB is responsible for investigating all aviation accidents. In
some cases, the NTSB delegates the investigation to the Federal Aviation
Administration (the "FA A "). The NTSB, however, remains responsible
for determining the "probable cause" of the accident.

Structure
Management
The NTSB is managed by five board members, who are assisted
by the offices of the managing director, public affairs, congres-

31

The National Transportation Safety Board (the "NTSB") has the statutory authority
to, among other things, make: "[P]eriodic reports to the Congress, Federal, State,
and local agencies concerned with transportation safety, and other interested
persons recommending and advocating meaningful responses to reduce the
likelihood of recurrence of transportation accidents similar to those investigated by
the Board and proposing corrective steps to make the transportation of persons as
safe and free from risk of injury as is possible, including steps to minimize human
injuries from transportation accidents;. . . special studies and special investigations
on matters pertaining to safety in transportation including human injury
avoidance; [and]. . . techniques and methods of accident investigation and prepare
and publish from time to time recommended procedures for accident
investigations___ "
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sional and intergovernmental relations, safety recommendations
and general counsel.
Board Members
The board members are full-time federal governmental employ
ees appointed for five year staggered terms by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. No more than three board
members may be of the same political party. Moreover, at least
three of the five board members must have some expertise in the
fields of accident reconstruction, safety engineering, human fac
tors, transportation safety or transportation regulation. The du
ties of all board members include: (1) establishing policy on
transportation safety issues and problems, and on Board goals,
objectives and operations; (2) reviewing and approving all acci
dent reports and safety recommendations; and (3) presiding over
hearings and testifying before congressional committees.
The President with the advice and consent of the Senate also des
ignates individual board members to serve as chairman and vice
chairman of the NTSB for two year terms. The chairman is the
chief executive officer of the NTSB. The responsibilities of the
chairman include: (1) appointing and supervising personnel em
ployed by the NTSB; (2) distributing NTSB business among per
sonnel and among administrative units of the NTSB; and (3) the
use and expenditure of NTSB funds. The vice chairman acts as
chairman in the event of the absence or incapacity of the chair
man or in the case of a vacancy in the office of the chairman.
Office of Managing Director
The office of managing director implements the NTSB's pro
grams by coordinating the day-to-day operations of the NTSB
staff. Responsibilities include: (1) scheduling and managing the
board members' review of major reports; and (2) providing ex
ecutive secretarial services.
Office of Public Affairs
The office of public affairs is responsible for keeping the public
informed on the work of the NTSB and its efforts to improve
transportation safety. Responsibilities include: (1) answering
questions from the public, the news media, and the transporta
tion industry; (2) coordinating media coverage of major accident
sites; and (3) disseminating safety information to increase public
awareness of the NTSB's activities.
Office of Congressional & Intergovernmental Relations
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The office of congressional & intergovernmental relations keeps
Congress and federal, state, and local government agencies in
formed on the NTSB's efforts to improve transportation safety.
Responsibilities include: (1) responding to oral and written in
quiries and addressing problems and concerns raised by the
Congress and other governmental entities; and (2) preparing tes
timony for board member participation at Congressional hear
ings and providing various information on legislation at the
federal, state and local government levels.
■

Office of Safety Recommendations
The office of safety recommendations helps to ensure the NTSB
issues appropriate and effective recommendations for enhancing
safety in all transportation modes. This includes: (1) coordinat
ing various safety recommendation programs; and (2) develop
ing other programs to increase acceptance of the NTSB
recommendations.

■

Office of General Counsel
The office of general counsel provides legal advice on policy, leg
islation, the NTSB rules, and other legal matters. This includes:
(1) assisting the Department of Justice in representing the NTSB
in court proceedings; and (2) providing legal assistance and
guidance to the above offices regarding hearings, appearances as
witnesses and the taking of depositions.

The P arty System
Investigations are conducted by the " party system ." Under the party sys
tem the NTSB staff directs the investigation, but allows all parties with a
legitimate interest in the investigation (excluding lawyers) to participate
in the process. For example, if the investigation involves an airplane crash
in which engine failure is a possible cause, members of the investigative
team may include representatives of (1) the manufacturer of the engine;
(2) the manufacturer of the airplane; (3) the air traffic controllers union;
and (4) the pilots union. All parties are present during each step in the in
vestigation and receive copies of all factual information produced.
On occasion, the NTSB will contract with a third party to assist in the
investigation. For example, if the NTSB's lab is unavailable, it may hire an
independent lab to assist in the examination. The work of any inde
pendent party, however, is directly supervised by the staff and observed
by the other members of the party system.
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The Investigation
As an investigation begins for the NTSB, the staff in charge instructs all
members of the party system (the ''Parties") that opinions and speculation
as to the cause of the accident are not to be discussed. At the conclusion
of each day of the on-site investigation, the Parties attend progress meet
ings in which they are provided the opportunity to share information.
The NTSB staff prevents the discussion from including opinions or specu
lation as to the causes of the accident.
Prior to the conclusion of the on-site investigation, each specialized
group within the investigation party prepares a "group report" summa
rizing the factual information discovered, which is shared with all of the
Parties. The NTSB monitors the content of the reports to ensure that they
exclude any opinions or speculation as to the cause of the accident.
The analysis of the accident, the findings, the determination of prob
able cause and the letters of recommendations resulting from the investi
gation are prepared by the NTSB staff, and are approved by the NTSB
board before becoming publicly available. Of these items, only a draft of
the analysis and letters of recommendation may be shared with the Parties
before they are finalized and made available to the public. Any member
of the party system who disagrees with the NTSB board's analysis or rec
ommendations may prepare a written dissent, which is made publicly
available.

The Public D ocket
The "public docket" for each investigation is stored on microfiche and
available for public viewing at the public inquiries office of the NTSB. All
confirmed factual information including the group reports, witness state
ments, mechanical reports, interviews and other materials obtained from the
investigation is placed in the public docket.32 Such information, as well as
any other factual information resulting from the investigation, is generally
admissible as evidence in litigation.
As noted above, the analysis of the accident, the determinations of
probable cause and the letters of recommendation are done solely by the
NTSB staff. This is true even when the investigation is delegated to the
FAA. Once approved by the NTSB, the analysis, the determination of

32
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Prior to being placed in the "public docket" this information is made available to
the public at the scene of the accident in connection with daily news briefings
conducted by the NTSB.
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probable cause and the recommendations become part of the Board's final
report and are also included in the public docket. This part of the report,
however, generally is not admissible as evidence in actions for damages.

The NTSB R eports
33

Every NTSB investigation results in a final report.
The reports are gen
erally disseminated to the public through the press.3 4
The NTSB also distributes the reports to hundreds of government
agencies, associations, manufacturers, operators and others who the Board
believes would be in a position to prevent the recurrence of the accident.35
Each division of the NTSB maintains a database of potential report recipi
ents.

Effects o f th e NTSB W ith R espect to Litigation
NTSB activities have been claimed to reduce litigation. The NTSB believes
that its open process puts pressure on all parties to fix problems which
may lead to accidents. Thus, they believe that as problems are corrected,
accidents decrease, and litigation becomes less frequently necessary.
Uncertainty exists as to the effect of the Board's probable cause deter
minations on the outcome of private litigation. Examples do exist when
the party found responsible by the NTSB was exonerated by the court.
One example is the Exxon Valdez accident. Although the NTSB report
found that Captain Hazelwood's impairment from alcohol intoxication
was a factor in the "probable cause" of the accident, at trial the jury acquit
ted Hazelwood of the charge of operating a vessel while intoxicated.

33

The NTSB report may consist of as little as a two-page summary if the investigation
has been delegated to the FAA.

34

To provide a sense of this information, a NTSB aircraft accident report may include
sections entitled: Factual Information; Analysis; Conclusions including Findings
and Probable Cause; and Recommendations. The "Factual Information" may
include the crew's composition, relevant medical factors, communication issues,
injuries to persons and previous Board actions, among other topics. The "Analysis"
may include information from the relevant manufacturer and various
considerations by the NTSB.

35

For example, a report concerning a highway accident may include distribution to
the National Association of Driver's Education Instructors and to auto insurance
companies.
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Ap p e n d ix E
A u d it c o m m it t e e g u id e l in e s

T

he Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Re
porting (Treadway Commission) contained recommendations to im
prove the effectiveness of audit committees.

This appendix includes practical tools that audit committees may
find useful in evaluating the scope and adequacy of their oversight activi
ties to ensure that they are as comprehensive as recommended by the
Treadway Commission.
The first portion of the appendix is drawn from proposals contained
in the Treadway Commission's report and the remaining portion is based
on appendices I and K of that report.
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Establishes a lone-at-the-top.”
Creates a process by which all
employees are encouraged to
conduct themselves properly and
annually reinforces such
encouragement. Audit committee
monitoring adds further importance to
policy.

Ensures that internal audit process is
effective by establishing top
management support for function and
ensuring direct access to Audit
Committee.

2. Internal Auditor Involvem ent at the
Corporate Level
Recommendation: Managem ent and the
audit committee should ensure that the
internal auditors’ involvement in the audit
of the entire financial reporting process is
appropriate and properly coordinated with
the independent public accountant.

BENEFITS

1. Code of Corporate Conduct
Recommendation: Public companies should
develop and enforce written codes of
corporate conduct. Codes of conduct should
foster a strong ethical climate and open
channels of communication to help protect
against fraudulent financial reporting. A s a
part of its ongoing oversight of the
effectiveness of internal controls, a
company’s audit committee should review
annually the program that management
establishes to monitor compliance with the
code.

TREADWAY COMMISSION
PROPOSALS
COMMENTARY

RECOMMENDED

Ensures that audit committee
members have no conflicts of interest
when reviewing adequacy of financial
reporting and monitoring internal and
outside auditors.

Safeguards against inadequate
financial reporting. Ensures that
directors discharge their
responsibilities. Treadway suggested
Good Practice Guidelines be
considered.

Establishes a framework to enhance
the effectiveness of the audit
committee. Periodic review of the
charter requires a re-evaluation of the
proper role the audit committee
should play in the financial process.

4. Informed, Vigilant and Effective
Audit Com m ittees
Recommendation: Audit committees
should be informed, vigilant and effective
overseers of the financial reporting
process and the company’s internal
controls.

5. Written Charter
Recommendation: All public com panies
should develop a written charter setting
forth the duties and responsibilities of the
audit committee. The board of directors
should approve the charter, review it
periodically and modify it as necessary.

b e n e f it s

3. Mandatory Independent Audit
Committee
Recommendation: The boards of directors
of all public companies should be required
by a rule adopted by the Securities and
Exchange Com m ission (“S E C ”) to
establish audit committees com posed
solely of independent directors.

PROPOSALS

COMMENTARY
ACTION

b e n e f its
b e n e f it s

Provides the audit committee with
any required in-house staff or
administrative support ensures their
ability to discharge its responsibilities.

Committee oversight ensures that
independence is closely monitored
and is an essential feature of the
audit relationship.

Ensures that the audit committee
participates in the evaluation of
whether nonaudit services or any
other relationships impact the public
accountant’s independence.

TREADWAY COMMISSION
PROPOSALS

6. Resources and Authority
Recommendation: Audit committees
should have adequate resources and the
authority to discharge their responsibilities.

7. Review of the Public Accountant’s
Independence
Recommendation: The audit committee
should review management’s evaluation of
factors related to the independence of the
com pany’s public accountant. Both the
audit committee and management should
assist the public accountant in preserving
the auditor's independence.

8. Issu e Related to the Public
Accountant’s Independence
Recommendation: Before the beginning of
each year, the audit committee should
review management’s plans for engaging
the com pany’s independent public
accountant to perform management
advisory services during the coming year,
considering both the types of services that
may be rendered and the projected fees.

COMMENTARY
COMMENTARY

RECOMMENDED

Clarifies the audit committee’s role in
the financial reporting process and
reinforces its responsibility to properly
discharge its duties.

Provides visibility on significant
accounting issues being dealt with by
management and insight into
management’s relationship with the
independent accountants.

Extends audit committee oversight
responsibilities in order to ensure the
integrity of the quarterly reporting
process.

10. Seeking a Second Opinion
Recommendation: Management should
advise the audit committee when it seeks a
second opinion on a significant accounting
issue.

11. Quarterly Report
Recommendation: Audit committees
should oversee the quarterly reporting
process.

b e n e f it s

9. Audit Committee Chairm an’s Letter
Recommendation: All public companies
should be required by an S E C rule to
include in their annual reports to
stockholders a letter signed by the
chairman of the audit committee describing
the committee's responsibilities and
activities during the year.

PROPOSALS

COMMENTARY

ACTION

Expand Knowledge o f Company Operations. A system 
atic and continuing learning process for audit committee
members will increase their effectiveness. One way is
to review various financial aspects of the com pany on a
planned basis.

Reporting to the Board o f Directors. The committee
should report its activities to the full board on a regular
basis, such a s after each meeting, so that the board is
kept informed of its activities on a current basis.

Meetings. The committee should meet on a regular basis
and special meetings should be called a s circumstances
require. The committee should meet privately with the in
ternal auditor and the independent public accountant.

Size and Term o f Appointm ent. An audit oommittee nor
mally should consist of not fewer than three inde
pendent directors. The maximum size may vary, but
the committee should be small enough so that each
member is an active participant. The term of appoint
ment is at the discretion of the board of directors, but it
is desirable to have terms arranged to maintain continu
ity while bringing fresh perspectives to the work of the
committee.

TREADWAY COMMISSION’S GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDELINES
A . GENERAL

PRACTICE
PRESENT PRACTICE

present

COMMENTARY
COMMENTARY
recom m ended

Electronic Data Processing. The committee should
discuss with the internal auditor and the independent
public accountant what steps are planned for a review
of the com pany’s electronic data processing
procedures and controls and inquire a s to the specific
security program s to protect against computer fraud or
m isuse from both within and outside the company.

Audit Plans. The committee should review with the
chief internal auditor and the independent public
accountant their annual audit plans, including the
degree of coordination of the respective plans. The
committee should inquire a s to the extent to which the
planned audit scope can be relied upon to detect fraud
or w eaknesses in internal controls.

Company Counsel. The committee should meet regu
larly with the com pany’s general counsel, and outside
counsel when appropriate, to discuss legal matters that
may have a significant impact on the com pany’s finan
cial statements, in a number of com panies the general
counsel and/or outside counsel attend meetings.

TREADWAY COMMISSION’S GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDELINES
PRESENT PRACTICE

COMMENTARY

RECOMMENDED
ACTION

PRESENT PRACTICE
PRESENT PRACTICE

COMMENTARY
COMMENTARY

Issues related to this a ud it. Opinions on the
performance o f the public accounting firm by
appropriate management and the chief internal auditor.

B. Selection of an Independent Public Accountant

Areas Requiring Specia l A ttention. The committee
should instruct the independent public accountant and the
internal auditor that the committee expects to be advised if
there are any areas that require its special attention.

O fficer Expenses and Perquisites. The committee
should review in-house policies and procedures for
regular review of officers’ expenses and perquisites,
including any use of corporate assets, inquire a s to the
results of the review and, if appropriate, review a
summarization of the expenses and perquisites of the
period under review.

Other Auditors. The committee should inquire a s to the
extent to which independent public accountants other
than the principal auditor are to be used and
understand the rationale for using them. The
committee should request that their work be
coordinated and that an appropriate review of their work
be performed by the principal auditor.

TREADWAY COMMISSION’S GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDELINES

RECOMMENDED

Any significant litigation problems or disciplinary actions
by the S E C or others.

Issues related to the firm generally: The report of the
public accounting firm’s latest peer review conducted
pursuant to a professional quality control program.

If a new public accounting firm is being considered, the
steps planned to ensure a smooth and effective transition.

The expected level of participation by the partner and
other management personnel in the audit examination,
the mix of skills and experience of the staff and staff
rotation policy.

The proposed audit fee and the independent public
accountant’s engagement letter; explanations for fee
changes.

TREADWAY COMMISSION’S GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDELINES
PRESENT PRACTICE

COMMENTARY

RECOMMENDED
ACTION

The committee should inquire about the existence and
substance of any significant accounting accruals,
reserves or estimates made by management that had a
material impact on the financial statements.

The committee should request an explanation from
financial management and the independent public
accountant of changes in accounting standards or rules
promulgated by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, the S E C or other regulatory bodies that have an
effect on the financial statements.

The committee should obtain from management
explanation for all significant variances in the financial
statements between years. (This review may be
performed at a meeting of the entire board.) The
committee should consider whether the data are
consistent with the Management’s Discussion and
A nalysis (MD&A) section of the annual report.

The public accounting firm’s credentials, capabilities
and reputation and a list of clients in the sam e industry
and geographical area.

TREADWAY COMMISSION’S GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDELINES

C. Post-audit Review

PRESENT PRACTICE

COMMENTARY

RECOMMENDED
ACTION

The committee should review the letter of management
representations given to the independent public
accountant and inquire whether the accountant
encountered any difficulties in obtaining the letter or any
specific representations therein.

The committee should ask the independent public
accountant to identify the accountant’s greatest
concerns and discuss with the committee anything else
that the accountant believes should be discussed but
has not been raised or covered elsewhere.

The committee should meet privately with the
independent public accountant discuss the
accountant’s opinion on various matters to including the
quality of financial and accounting personnel and the
internal audit staff.

The committee should inquire of management and the
independent public accountant if there were any
significant financial reporting issu e s during the
accounting period and if so how they were resolved.

TREADWAY COMMISSION’S GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDELINES
PRESENT PRACTICE

COMMENTARY

RECOMMENDED
ACTION

The committee and the board of directors should
consider whether the independent public accountants
should meet with the full board to discuss any matters
relative to the financial statements and to answer any
questions that other directors may have.

The committee should review with management the
M D& A section of the annual report and ask the extent
to which the independent public accountant reviewed
the M D& A section. The committee should inquire of the
independent public accountant if the other sections of
the annual report to stockholders are consistent with
the information reflected in the financial statements.

The committee should determine the open years on
federal income tax returns and whether there are any
significant items that have been or might be disputed by
the Internal Revenue Service and inquire a s to the
status of the related tax reserves.

The committee should d iscu ss with management and
the independent public accountant the substance of
any significant issues raised by in-house and outside
counsel concerning litigation, contingencies, claims or
assessm ents. The committee should understand how
such matters are reflected in the com pany’s financial
statements.

TREADWAY COMMISSION’S GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDELINES

PRESENT PRACTICE
PRESENT PRACTICE

COMMENTARY
COMMENTARY

RECOMMENDED
ACTION

PRESENT PRACTICE

COMMENTARY

RECOMMENDED

The activities of the audit committee during the past
year including matters such a s the number of meetings
held and the significant topics discussed with
management, the internal auditors or the independent
public accountants.

The audit committee’s purpose, objectives and
responsibilities.

The identity of each audit committee member, unless
disclosed elsewhere.

The composition of the audit committee.

D. Audit Committee Chairman’s Letter
Among other subjects, the audit committee chairman’s letter could discuss:

TREADWAY COMMISSION’S GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDELINES
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